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NEW TOOLS FOR COMBATING
UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE AND ABUSIVE
MORTGAGE PRACTICES: NEW
AMENDMENTS To REGULATION Z
Solomon Maman*
INTRODUCTION
n a press release issued July 14, 2o08, the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System ("Board") announced its
approval of final rules amending Regulation Z.' The new rules
promise to protect consumers against unfair, abusive, and
deceptive lending practices while preserving consumers' access to
responsible lending and sustainable homeownership.2 The new
rules are the result of an extensive public discourse over the past
several years3 and they were announced as the consequences of
this decade's rapid proliferation of subprime and Alternative-A
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Chicago School of Law; LL.M. in Business Law, 2004, Loyola University
Chicago School of Law; LL.B., 1998, The University of Sheffield, England,
U.K. This article is dedicated to the loving memory of my mother, Jacqueline
Maman, who made it possible for me to pursue the path of legal education.
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Board Issues
Final Rule Amending Home Mortgage Provisions of Regulation Z (July 14,
2008) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/
2oo80714a.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2008); 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Reg. Z (Truth in
Lending).
2 Statement by Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, Fed.
Reserve Sys. (July 14, 2008) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/bcreg/bernankeregz2oo8o714.htm (last visited Nov. 13,
2008).
3 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note i.
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("Alt-A") mortgages were unfolding.4
Between 2ooi and 20o6 the U.S. experienced an
unprecedented boom of mortgage activity fuelled by low interest
rates and rapid housing value appreciation. During that time the
mortgage market also experienced a sharp increase in subprime
mortgage lending and in the use of Alt-A mortgage programs. As
production increased in subprime and Alt-A loans, concerns
began mounting by regulators and consumer advocates regarding
lending practices and the types of products marketed to
consumers. These concerns began materializing in late 2006 and
early 2007 as rising interest rates and declining house values
began affecting consumers in the subprime market. Since then,
subprime and Alt-A mortgage delinquencies have reached
unprecedented levels and mortgage foreclosures are now at an all
time high.
Unfortunately, despite the new rules' aim at protecting
consumers in the mortgage market, it will likely provide little
help to consumers already caught in the current subprime lending
crisis. Yet, the introduction of the new rules is a step in the right
direction, as it sends a clear message that the Board is committed
to the task of forestalling further harm to consumers in the
mortgage market and willing to take innovative steps within its
authority to achieve this goal.
This article intends to introduce the reader to the new
rules amending Regulation Z and discuss their intended impact
on consumers in the mortgage market. Part I of this article is
comprised of two general sections that are intended to provide the
reader with the important factors that contributed to the
promulgation of the new rules. The first section will introduce
the reader to the problem of "predatory mortgage lending" and
the "non-prime mortgage market." These concepts are essential
to understanding the events which occurred this decade in the
mortgage market, which the second section discusses in more
detail.
Part II will provide a general review of the Truth in
Lending Act ("TILA") and the Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act ("HOEPA")6 as implemented under Regulation Z,
I Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Regulation Z, Final Rule, 73
Fed. Reg. 44,522; 44,524 (July 30, 2oo8).
Truth In Lending Act ("TILA"), I5 U.S.C. §§ 16oi-i649.
6 See Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act
of I994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 151-58, io8 Stat. 219o-98 (i994) (codified
throughout I5 U.S.C. §§ 16oi-i649).
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which are the statutory and regulatory schemes under which the
new rules will operate. Part III will provide a detailed review of
key provisions of the final rules. In Part IV several of the key
provisions reviewed in Part III will be discussed and their impact
and benefits on consumers will be further explored.
I. BACKGROUND OF PROBLEMS AND EVENTS IN THE MORTGAGE
MARKET
A. The Problem of Predatory Mortgage Lending
The problem of predatory mortgage lending has been the
focus of debate by policy makers, consumer advocates and
academics for more than a decade.' The term predatory
mortgage lending does not have a precise definition, because
many lending terms and practices can be either legitimate or
predatory depending on the context in which they are made.
Instead, predatory mortgage lending generally refers to a range of
overarching abusive lending terms and practices.9 Such abusive
lending terms include, for example, charging excessive fees that
are unjustified in relation to the services performed'1 or charging
See, e.g., Problems in Community Development Banking, Mortgage
Lending Discrimination Redlining, and Home Equity Lending, Hearings
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, Io3d Cong. (Feb. 3,
17, 24, 1993); Predatory Lending:Are Federal Agencies Protecting Older
Americans From Financial Heartbreak? Hearing Before the Special Comm. on
Aging, io8th Cong. (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO
/LPS5228 4 [hereinafter Hearing on Predatory Lending]; Subprime and
Predatory Lending: New Regulatory Guidance, Current Market Conditions,
and Effects on Regulated Financial Institutions, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the Comm. on Fin. Serv., iioth Cong.
(Mar. 27, 2007), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS85I94
[hereinafter Hearing on Subprime and Predatory Lending]; see also, Julia
Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging The American Dream: A Critical Evaluation
Of The Federal Government's Promotion Of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL.
L. REV. 373 (I994) [hereinafter Mortgaging The American Dream].
s JOINT U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEv.-U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY LENDING, CURBING PREDATORY
HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 17 (June 2ooo), http://www.huduser.org/
Publications/pdf/ treasrpt.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2008) [hereinafter
CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING].
' See Hearing on Predatory Lending, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of
David Wood, Director, Fin. Mkt. and Cmty. Inv., U.S. Gen. Accounting
Office).
10 See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE ("GAO") -
[Vol. 21: 2
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excessive interest rates that are far beyond justification based on
the borrower's credit profile.1" Abusive lending practices include,
for example, lending without regard to the borrowers' ability to
repay, a practice also known as "equity-based-lending", 12 or the
practice of "loan flipping"" and outright fraud and deception.14
Predatory mortgage lending poses serious concern to
policy makers due to its effects on individual borrowers and
communities. 5 The harm caused by predatory mortgage lending
on individual borrowers ranges from financial hardship, loss of
home equity and at its worse, foreclosure and loss of homes. 6
When individual foreclosure occurs the circle of harm widens and
effects communities and neighborhoods by depressing property
values, resulting in further loss of equity to other homeowners in
the same community or neighborhood. Furthermore, macro
effects caused by widespread foreclosures can include losses to
investors in mortgage backed securities that are held by the
general public at large through pension funds and investments in
FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING
PREDATORY LENDING 18 (Jan. 30, 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov
new.items/d0428o.pdf [hereinafter GAO PREDATORY LENDING REPORT].
11 Id.; see also Predatory mortgage lending: the problem, impact, and
responses, Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs,
U.S. S., I07th Cong. 346 (July 26 and 27, 2ooi), available at
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS26168 (statement of David Berenbaum,
National Community Reinvestment Coalition).
12 See Kurt Eggert, Held Up In Due Course: Predatory Lending,
Securitization, And The Holder In Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 503, 588 (2002). Such practices strongly suggest that lender's sole reason
for making the loan is its ability to realize the collateral through foreclosure
upon a borrower's default. See CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE
LENDING, supra note 8, at 22.
13 See GAO PREDATORY LENDING REPORT, supra note io, at 19; see also
CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING, supra note 8, at 21. Loan
flipping is refinancing borrowers' loans repeatedly in a short period of time
without any economic benefit for the borrowers in order to extract additional
costs and fees that strip borrowers' equity from their homes.
14 See GAO PREDATORY LENDING REPORT, supra note io, at ig; see also
CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING, supra note 8. Fraud and
deception can be perpetrated through a variety of tactics, including changing
loan application and settlement documents, engaging in "asset flipping" or
"bait and switch" schemes to mislead consumers.
15 See Hearing on Predatory Lending, supra note 7, at i (statement of Sen.
Larry Craig, Chairman).
16 See GAO PREDATORY LENDING REPORT, supra note io, at 25.
17 Id.
2008]
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mutual funds or other investments."' Thus, widespread
delinquencies and foreclosures can have adverse financial
consequences on the general public vis-a-vis the financial
markets at large, as experienced in the current financial market
crisis.
The lack of a precise definition makes it hard to deal with
the problem of predatory mortgage lending and to appraise its
magnitude.19 In the course of searching for a solution to the
problem of predatory mortgage lending many consumer
advocates and policy makers have blurred the lines between
predatory mortgage lending and subprime mortgage lending.20
Nevertheless, there are those who see predatory and subprime
lending as two distinct issues requiring two distinct solutions. 1
B. The Non-prime Mortgage Market.
Today's mortgage market consists of three categories of
mortgage lending: "prime", "Alt-A" and "subprime".22 Prime
mortgage lending generally caters to borrowers who exhibit
strong credit histories and have demonstrable repayment
abilities 23 and represents approximately 75 percent of mortgage
borrowers.2 4 The remaining categories of "subprime" and "Alt-A",
together referred to as "non-prime", will be discussed in more
detail below.
i. Subprime Lending History in Brief
In general, subprime lending refers to both mortgages and
18 Id. at 37.
19 See GAO PREDATORY LENDING REPORT, supra note io, at 23.
20 See Hearing on Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 7, at 3
(statement Rep. Paul E. Gillmor).
2 See Hearing on Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 7, at 3
(statement Rep. Paul E. Gilimor).
22 See Mortgage Market Turmoil: Causes and Consequence, Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, i ioth Cong. 4 (Mar.
22, 2007) (statement of Roger T. Cole, Director, Div. of Banking Supervision &
Regulation, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.) http://banking.senate.
gov/public/_files/cole.pdf [hereinafter Cole, Mortgage Market Turmoil],
2' Edward M. Gramlich, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Subprime Mortgage
Lending: Benefits, Costs, and Challenges (May 21, 2004), http://www.
federalreserve.govlboarddocsspeeches/2004/2004052i/default.htm (last visited
Nov. 13, 2008).
24 See Cole, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 22, at 4.
198 [Vol. 21: 2
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consumer lending, and subprime mortgage lending refers to a
segment of the mortgage market. The term "Subprime Lending"
was coined sometime in the early 199os by the securitization
industry, Wall Street firms or rating agencies in an attempt to
distinguish securities backed by mortgages made to borrowers
with excellent credit from securities backed by mortgages made
to borrowers with impaired credit. 5 Subprime lending as a
practice, however, has existed long before the term was coined,
and subprime lenders prior to the early 199os were usually
known as "Finance Companies. 2 6
Subprime lending carved its niche in the consumer credit
market by providing a source of funds for those borrowers who
were underserved by commercial banks and thrifts, borrowers
with blemished credit characteristics, borrowers with low-to-
moderate income, and minorities. 7 Prior to the late 1970s
subprime lending consisted primarily of small, unsecured loans. 8
With the rise of inflation towards the end of the 1970s, interest
rates on unsecured loans to riskier borrowers rose considerably
and prevented subprime lenders in many states from being able
to offer unsecured loans with rates within states usury limits. 29
The same inflation also helped home values to rise, creating large
untapped pools of equity that could be used as security for
lenders.3 0 As a result, subprime lenders began making consumer
loans secured by second lien mortgages." Using the homes with
appreciated values as collateral enabled subprime lenders to offer
borrowers lower rates than unsecured loans,32 thus avoiding
25 SMR RESEARCH CORP., THE SUBPRIME LENDING INDUSTRY AND
ALLEGATIONS OF PREDATORY PRACTICES 5 (Apr. 2ooo), available at
http://www.butera-andrews.com/legislative-updates/directory/Background-
Reports/FINAL%2oSMR%2oReport.pdf. (hereinafter SMR, THE SUBPRIME
LENDING INDUSTRY].
26 Id.
27 Id. at 5-6; see also CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING,
supra note 8, at 23 (low to moderate income borrowers and borrowers in
predominantly minority neighborhoods often have limited access to
mainstream financial institutions, because mainstream commercial banks and
thrifts do not often have branches in those neighborhoods).
18 SMR, THE SUBPRJME LENDING INDUSTRY, supra note 25, at 6.
29 Id.
30 Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road To Subprime "Hel" Was Paved With
Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation And The Subprime Home
Equity Market, 5, S.C. L. REV. 473, 521 (2000) [hereinafter The Road To
Subprime "Hel"].
31 SMR, THE SUBPRIME LENDING INDUSTRY, supra note 25, at 6.
32 Id.; see also Patterson, Mortgaging The American Dream, supra note 7,
2008]
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reaching or passing the interest rate ceiling placed by the states.33
The subprime industry continued to grow during the
ig8os primarily due to the deregulation of the mortgage industry
with the enactment of the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monitory Control Act of 1980 ("DIDMCA"),34 which
preempted states' interest rate caps on first lien mortgages;" and
the enactment of the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity
Act of 1982,36 which preempted state laws regarding certain loan
structures, such as adjustable rate mortgages ("ARM"s) and
balloon loans. In addition, the enactment of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, which eliminated most consumer interest deductions
except for interest paid on loans secured by principal residents
and second homes, provided incentives for the accelerated use
of debt consolidation loans to consolidate unsecured debt and
further fueled the growth of the subprime mortgage market.
39
Nevertheless, during the i98os subprime mortgage lending
was still primarily concentrated in making small second lien
mortgages. ° It was in the early I99os that favorable court
decisions regarding the interpretation of "first lien" in DIDMCA
expanded the role of subprime mortgage lending to concentrate
on first lien mortgage refinancing, a move that considerably
increased the dollar amount of subprime mortgage loans and its
relative volume in the total mortgage market.
41
at 383.
31 SMR, THE SUBPRIME LENDING INDUSTRY, supra note 25, at 6.
14 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of I98O
("DIDMCA"), Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 5oI(a), 94 Stat. 132, i6I (originally
codified as a note to 12 U.S.C. § I735f-7, now codified as 12 U.S.C. § I735f-7a).
31 See Mansfield, The Road To Subprime "Hel", supra note 30, at 492; see
also Souphala Chomsisengphet & Antony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of
the Subprime Mortgage Market, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOuIs REV. 31, 38
(2006).
36 Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982 ("AMTPA"),
Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96
Stat. 1469 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 38oi-38o6).
31 See Mansfield, The Road To Subprime "Hel", supra note 30, at 5 10.
38 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, ioo Stat. 2085, (codified as
amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
39 See SMR, THE SUBPRIME LENDING INDUSTRY, supra note 25, at 8; gee
also Patterson, Mortgaging The American Dream, supra note 7, at 414-15.
40 See CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING, supra note 8,
at 31; see also SMR, THE SUBPRIME LENDING INDUSTRY, supra note 25, at 8.
41 See, e.g., Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907 (3d
Cir. 199o); see also Mansfield, The Road To Subprime "Hel", supra note 30, at
518-i9.
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Structural changes in the mortgage market had also
contributed to the growth of the subprime mortgage market.
Specifically, the proliferation of non-depository mortgage
companies and mortgage brokers aided significantly to in the
expansion of the mortgage market as a whole and in particular to
the expansion of subprime lending.42  In addition, the
development of credit scoring and reporting, as well as the use of
automated underwriting, helped fuel the expansion of the
subprime mortgage market. The development of better credit
scoring and reporting have enabled lenders to more efficiently
assess price risk of borrowers; 43 it may have, however, also
increased the number of subprime borrowers due to reported
credit imperfections."
Most importantly, the growth of the subprime market has
been fueled by access to cheaper capital through the secondary
market and securitization.45  Using the originate-to-distribute
model, subprime lenders sold their mortgages to investors in the
secondary market who pooled large numbers 'of mortgages
together, turned them into mortgage backed securities and then
sold those securities with an attached right to the resulting cash
flow to investors both in the U.S. and around the world.46 In a
span of ten years, the subprime securitization industry grew from
an estimated $17.61 billion in 1995, to an estimated $464.59
billion in 2005.47
42 See generally Mansfield, The Road To Subprime "Hel", supra note 30, at
526.
41 See Legislative and Regulatory Options for Minimizing and Mitigating
Mortgage Foreclosures, Before the Comm. on Fin. Serv., iioth Cong. 72 (Sep.
20, 2007), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS9o774 [hereinafter
Hearing on Legislative and Regulatory Options] (statement of Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman of Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys.).
44 See SMR, THE SUBPRIME LENDING INDUSTRY, supra note 25, at 7.
41 See Hearing on Legislative and Regulatory Options, supra note 43, at 72.
46 Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., The
Recent Financial Turmoil and its Economic and Policy Consequences (Oct. i5,
2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20071o5 a.
htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2oo8).
41 See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. FDIC Outlook, Fall 2006, 5 Charts 2 and 4,
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/regional/ro2oo63q/na/t3q
2oo6.pdf (the volume estimates provided are a combination of the data from
Chart 2, which shows the total nonagency MBS issuance volume in dollar
amounts per year from 1985 to 2005, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
analytical/regional/ro2oo63q/na/2oo6_falloicharto2.html (last visited Nov. 13,
20o8); and the data from Chart 4, which provides a percentage breakdown of
nonagency MBS issuance for 1995 and 2005, available at http://www.fdic.gov/
2008]
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2. Subprime Mortgage Lending Characteristics
Subprime mortgage lending generally caters to borrowers
who have sparse credit histories or histories of payment
delinquencies, collections, charge-offs, judgments, bankruptcies
and foreclosures. 4  The existence of any of these characteristics
on borrowers' credit histories tends to result in low credit scores.
49
Low credit scores and high debt-to-income ratios 0 are evidence of
a borrower's reduced payment capacities.5 ' Subprime mortgage
loans are loans made to borrowers that may exhibit one or more,
if not all, of the above characteristics. Not surprisingly, the
demographics of subprime borrowers tend to reflect communities
of minorities and populations that have low or volatile income
and are less well-educated. 3
Because of the possibility of an array of different
combinations of borrowers' characteristics and circumstances,
subprime underwriting typically involves careful examination of
the borrower's particular circumstances. 4 Although the mortgage
industry seems to have embraced the. use of automated
underwriting," a review of a recent mortgage technology survey
bank/analytical/regional/ro2oo63q/na/2oo6falloicharto4.html (last visited
Nov. 13, 2008)).
48 See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. & Office of Thrift Supervision,
Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs 2 (Jan. 31, 2001),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/boardacts/20o/200103 I/attac
hment.pdf [hereinafter "Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending
Programs"].
49 See CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING, supra note 8,
at 33.
10 Debt-to-income ratios ("DTI") are calculated by dividing the borrower's
fixed monthly expenses by the borrower's gross monthly income.
sI See Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs (Jan. 31,
2001), supra note 48, at 2-3.
52 Id.
s3 See CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING, supra note 8,
at 33, 35-37.
' 54 See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., SUBPRIME MARKET, THE
ROLE OF THE GSES, AND RISK-BASED PRICING 28 (Mar. 2002), available at
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/subprime.pdf ("lenders belive that
subprime mortgage underwriting involves making 'story loans', in which
underwriters must take into account factors beyond those that can be
quantified") [hereinafter SUBPRIME MARKET, THE ROLE OF THE GSEs].
" MORTEC, LLC, MORTECH 2007 FREQUENCIES REPORT 49 (Dec.
2007), http://www.mortech-llc.com/downloads/2007_vo12.pdf (survey of 328
mortgage lenders showed that in general 92% of lenders surveyed are.using
[V01. 21:2
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suggests that only a small percentage of lenders surveyed use
automated underwriting as the sole decision maker.5 6 This
suggests that, by and large, underwriting determination for
subprime loans remains, as it was traditionally, the result of a
relatively slower manual processing of the loan.
The subprime mortgage market also experiences
delinquency rates higher than those experienced in the prime
mortgage market,"8 which results in higher servicing costs due to
an increase in collection efforts.5 9 Another characteristic more
unique to the subprime market is early repayment through
refinancing. 60 Early repayment means that subprime lenders may
not realize the full potential gain from the loan. This is a
particular problem for lenders holding servicing portfolios and
for the attractiveness of subprime loans securitization because
both rely on the continuation of the underlining mortgage asset
performance.6
The combination of subprime characteristics, including:
higher cost of production due to slower process, higher servicing
costs due to delinquencies, as well as early prepayments and
history of Credit problems, generally results in higher costs of
credit for subprime borrowers in terms of rates and fees and loan
terms.62 In theory at least, the degree of cost varies based on the
degree of risk, this is also known as "risk-based pricing." This is
not to say, however, that the subprime market efficiently prices
borrowers' risk. Actually it was even suggested that that the
term "risk-based pricing" in the context of the subprime market is
somewhat of a "misnomer" as interest rates and fees charged vary
widely and may not necessarily correlate to borrowers' risk
profiles.63
automated underwriting systems to underwrite loans).
s6 Id. at 56 (according to the survey only 24.8% of lenders always use
automated underwriting systems for underwriting determinations).
57 See SUBPRIME MARKET, THE ROLE OF THE GSEs, supra note 54, at 28.
58 See CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING, supra note 8,
at 27; see also Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), Working
Paper, Economic Issues in Predatory Lending 9 (July 30, 2003),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/workingpaper.pdf [hereinafter OCC Working Paper].
"' Id. at 12.
60 See CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING, supra note 8,
at 28; see also OCC Working Paper, supra note 58 at i i.
61 See OCC Working Paper, supra note 58 at 4, ii.
62 See CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING, supra note 8,
at 28.
63 Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure In A World Of Risk-Based
2oo8] 203
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Consequently, the characteristics of subprime mortgage
lending, with its borrowers' demographics and higher rates and
fees, makes it fertile ground for lending abuse where predatory
lending is unfortunately prevalent.64 This in turn places the
subprime market in the focus of the debate over curbing
predatory lending. However, although the connection between
predatory mortgage lending and the subprime market is strong,
there are those who agree that predatory mortgage lending is not
synonymous with subprime mortgage lending6" and find that
subprime mortgage lending provides an important source of
funds for consumers who are otherwise unable to secure credit in
the prime mortgage market.66
3. Alt-A Lending Characteristics
The remaining segment of the mortgage market is that of
Alternative A or "Alt-A" mortgage lending. This "loosely
defined" category caters to borrowers that fall between prime and
subprime. 6s These borrowers have marginal to very good credit
histories but they do not meet prime underwriting documentation
requirements, debt-to-income ratios, or loan-to-value ratios.69
Alt-A mortgages include loans with reduced documentation
features, such as "low doc/no doc", "no income no asset", "stated
Pricing, 44 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 123, 127 (2007).
64 See Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its Customers, Joint
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity and the
Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the Comm. on Fin. Serv.,
io8th Cong. 4 (Mar. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Maxine Waters) ("While not
all subprime loans are predatory, predatory lending is concentrated in the
subprime loan market. Predatory lending preys upon poor and minority
neighborhoods, where the best loans are rarely available: neighborhoods where
the number of subprime loan outlets usually vastly exceed the number of
banks available."); see also id. at 24-25 (statement of George Butts, ACORN
Hous. Corp.).
65 See Hearing on Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 7, at 9
(statement of Hon. John M. Reich, Director, OTS).
66 See CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING, supra note 8,
at 5'.
67 See Cole, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 22, at 4 (Alt-A category
is also referred to as "near-prime").
61 Id. (according to Cole the Alt-A category is "somewhat ill-defined").
69 Id.; see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Outlook, Summer 2006, 29,
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/regional/ro2oo62q/na/t2q2o
o6.pdf. Loan-to-value ratios ("LTV") are calculated by dividing the loan
amount by the lesser of the purchase price or appraised value.
[V01. 21: 2
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income" or "stated assets"; or loans made to borrowers with no
credit scores or credit scores higher than subprime; loans with
high loan-to-value ratios, that are greater than 8o percent and do
not include mortgage insurance; loans made to borrowers with
high debt-to-income ratios that are not considered subprime; or
loans made on investment properties. °
At least until the beginning of this decade Alt-A borrowers
were generally classified as part of the subprime mortgage
market.71. Although, there is evidence to suggest that Alt-A was
an independent category from subprime, at least as far as
securitization was concern.72  As a distinct category of the
mortgage market, Alt-A substantially grew in the early to mid
part of this decade, and was primarily fueled by securitization,
which grew from an estimated issuance of $490 million in i995 to
an estimated issuance of $333.55 billion in 2005. 73
Even though Alt-A borrowers have marginal to excellent
credit rating, due to the low level of documentation they can
provide to substantiate their repayment abilities, their high debt-
to-income, or high loan-to-value, they are considered a higher
risk.74 Consequentially, mortgage loans made to Alt-A borrowers
generally have higher rates and fees.75
However, mortgage loans made with limited to no
verification of a borrower's ability to repay, albeit the excellent
credit history, poses serious concerns regarding the motives of
lenders making such loans, as they could suggest reliance on
collateral in cases of default and foreclosure. 6 Moreover, reduced
70 See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Outlook, Summer 2006, supra note
69, at 29.
"' See Glenn B. Canner, Wayne Passmore & Elizabeth Laderman, The
Role of Specialized Lenders In Extending Mortgages to Lower-Income And
Minority Homebuyers, 85 FED. RES. BULL. 709, 76 (1999); see also CURBING
PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING, supra note 8, at 27, 34.
72 See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Outlook, Fall 2006, supra note 47, at
5 Chart 4.
." Id. at 5 Charts 2&4 (the volume estimates provided are a combination of
the data from Chart 2, which shows the total nonagency MBS issuance volume
in dollar amounts per year from 1985 to 2005, available at http://www.fdic.
gov/banklanalytical/regional/ro2oo63q/na/2oo6_falloicharto2.html; and the
data from Chart 4, which provides a percentage breakdown of nonagency
MBS issuance for 1995 and 2005, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
analyticallregional/ro2oo63q/nal2oo6_falloicharto4.html).
" See Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort & Glenn B. Canner, The
2oo6HMDA Data, 93 FED. RES. BULL. A7 3 , 76 (2007).
75 Id.
76 See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bd. of Governors of the
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documentation loans made to borrowers whose income could be
readily verified, such as employees, using a recent pay-stub, W-2
statement, or tax return, raises the question of whether no income
verification loans Alt-A loans should be provided to such
borrowers in the first place." Thus similar to subprime mortgage
lending, Alt-A mortgage lending has the propensity to trip the
wire of abusive lending practices.
C. Review of Events in the Mortgage Market: A Story of Boom
and Bust
The start of the new millennium brought with it an
unprecedented boom of housing and mortgage activity, fuelled by
low interest rates, rapid home value appreciation and product
innovations.7" Beginning in 2001 long-term mortgage interest
rates began declining rapidly, from 8.1 percent in 2000 to as low
as 5.25 percent in 2003.19 The decline was caused in part by the
increased use of mortgage securitization and the departure from
the simple "book-and-hold" model 0 to the more complex
"originate-to-distribute" model,81 which contributed considerably
to the mortgage market liquidity at low interest rates. As
mortgage rates began to decline many consumers across the
United States took advantage of the falling rates by refinancing
their existing mortgages, often taking cash out of their homes as
Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of Thrift Supervision &
Nat'l Credit Union Admin., Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional
Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,614 (Oct. 4, 2006).
See generally id. at 58,614-15.
78 See, e.g., Mortgage Market Turmoil: Causes and Consequence, Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, i ioth Cong. 3-4
(Mar. 22, 2007) (statement of Emory W. Rushton, Senior Deputy Comptroller
and Chief National Bank examiner, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency)
http://banking.senate.gov/public/-files/rushton.pdf. [hereinafter Rushton,
Mortgage Market Turmoil],
71 See Residential Loan Production-197o to 2006, National Mortgage
News, Oct. 11, 2006, Volume 31 issue 3, available at http://www.national
mortgagenews.com/premium/archive/?id=,54O94 (last visited Nov. 13, 2008)
[hereinafter Residential Loan Production -1970 to 2006].
80 Where lenders originate mortgages and hold them on their books until
repayment. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys,
The Subprime Mortgage Market (May. 17, 2007), http://www.federa!reserve.
gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke2007o517a.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
1 See supra text accompanying note 46.
82 See Cole, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 22, at 3; see also Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. FDIC Outlook, Summer 2006, supra note 69, at 22.
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well as lowering the rates on their mortgage loans.83 Other
consumers fulfilled their dream of homeownership, which
reached 68.6 percent by end of 2003.84 These market conditions
resulted in a significant expansion of the mortgage market, which
reached its record peak in 2003, where $3.9 trillion in residential
mortgages were funded."5 As a consequence of the surge in
mortgage demand and market expansion, mortgage lenders were
prompted to expend their loan operations to take advantage of
the market conditions.86
However, as mortgage interest rates began to rise in 2004,
mortgage origination volumes began to correspondingly decline.
Yet, demand for homes was still strong and home prices
continued to rise in 2004, which made it difficult for borrowers to
qualify for conventional loan products, such as fixed rates and
regular ARMs.88  In addition, secondary market investors'
demand for mortgage debt was still strong.8 9 By the end of 2004
mortgage loan origination volume reached $2.79 trillion, a 28.5
percent decline from the 2003 record origination high.9
These conditions left the mortgage market in a state of
overcapacity, placing significant pressure on mortgage lenders,
who had expanded their operations during the boom years of
2001 to 2003, to maintain production levels to keep their lending
operations afloat. 91 Responding to overcapacity concerns, rising
home prices, competition from other lenders and investors'
demand for mortgage debt, some mortgage lenders with
originate-to-distribute infrastructures began easing their credit
83 See Rushton, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 78, at 3-4.
84 U.S. Census Bureau, Table 5, Homeownership Rates for the United
States: 1968 to 2oo8, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/
hvs/qtr2o8/files/tab5 .xls.
85 See Residential Loan Production -1970 to 2006, supra note 79.
86 See Rushton, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 78, at 4.
8 See Cole, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 22, at 5; see also
Rushton, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 78, at 4.
88 Calculated Risk: Assessing Non-Traditional Mortgage Products, Hearing
Before the SubComm. On Hous. & Transp. And Subcomm. On Economic
Policy of the Comm. On Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, io 9 th Cong. 2
(Sep. 20, 2oo6), (statement by Sandra L. Thompson, Acting Director, Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp.) http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/thompson.pdf
[hereinafter Thompson, Calculated Risk].
89 See Cole, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 22, at 5; see also
Rushton, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 78, at 4.
90 See Residential Loan Production - 1970 to 2oo6, supra note 79.
91 See Cole, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 22, at 5; see also
Rushton, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 78, at 4.
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standards. These mortgage lenders began using "innovative"
solutions to boost production. 3  These "innovative" solutions
included relaxing underwriting standards and a shift towards
origination of nontraditional mortgage products as means of
"assisting" borrowers in purchasing higher-priced homes or
continued access to idle home equity.9
Products such as interest-only mortgage loans and
payment-option ARMs, which were previously marketed to
financially sophisticated borrowers as cash-flow tools, were being
marketed to first-time home buyers as "affordable loan" products
promising lower upfront monthly payments.95  Yet, these
"innovative" products were not appropriate for all borrowers.96
While borrowers with seasonal or irregular income could find
such payment schedules helpful, unsuspecting ordinary
borrowers were exposed to "payment shocks" that were suddenly
making their homes unaffordable and placing them in financial
distress. Moreover, mortgage lenders increasingly layered these
nontraditional products with other high-risk practices such as no
income verifications and high-loan to value ratios.9"
Similarly in the Subprime mortgage market risk layering
practices also took place where so called "2/28" and "3/27" hybrid
ARMs were marketed to borrowers offering an initial low rate for
a short fixed period of two or three years, also known as a
"teaser" rate.9 These loans, at the end of their short fixed period
caused the "teaser" rate to reset and begin adjusting based on an
index and margin.100 While such mortgage products assisted
subprime borrowers both to qualify for loans and to manage
payments during the early life of the loan, these products also
exposed subprime borrowers to payment shocks when the
92 See Cole, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 22, at 5.
93 Id.
91 See Rushton, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 78, at 4.
15 See Thompson, Calculated Risk, supra note 88, at 2.
96 See Calculated Risk: Assessing Non-Traditional Mortgage Products,
Hearing Before the SubComm. On Hous. & Transp. And Subcomm. On
Economic Policy of the Comm. On Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, Io9th
Cong. 5 (Sep. 20, 2006), http://banking.senate.gov/public/files/ACF84Di.pdf
(statement Allen J. Fishbein, Consumer Federation of America) [hereinafter
Fishbein, Calculated Risk].
97 Id.
98 See Cole, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 22, at 5.
11 See Rushton, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 78, at 6; see also
Fishbein, Calculated Risk, supra note 96, at 7.
100 See Fishbein, Calculated Risk, supra note 96, at 7.
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"teaser" rate adjusted.1 ' This was particularly true when rate
adjustments of loans had no caps or very high caps at rest
periods.0 2 Moreover, subprime hybrid ARMs were increasingly
combined with features like interest only payments, substantial
prepayment penalties or with prepayment penalties extending
beyond the initial fixed period. 3 In addition, in an effort to boost
production subprime lenders began relaxing underwriting criteria
and began approving borrowers without fully documenting their
income and properly checking their repayment ability.104 Adding
fuel to the fire, consumers were receiving inadequate information
from lenders regarding these products' features and terms. 105 The
combination of these terms and practices would prove to be a
disaster in the making.
By the end of 2005, the subprime market expansion
reached its historical peak with 20 percent market share and $62 5
billion in mortgage loan originations, up from 8 percent market
share and $312 billion of volume in 2003.106 On the positive side,
the subprime market expansion had also contributed to the
growth in homeownership rates, which reached 69 percent by the
end of 2005.107 These positive effects, however, were to be short
lived.
During the years 2000 through 2005 the housing market
rose at an annual rate of 9 percent. 0 8 While the housing market
was strong and interest rates were low, subprime borrowers
facing rate reset and payment shocks were able to refinance their
mortgage taking advantage of their house appreciation to qualify
for a new loan and to cover the cost of refinancing. 9 However,
by 2o6 the housing market began to cool, while at the same time
"' See Cole, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 22, at 5.
10' See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of Thrift Supervision &
Nat'l Credit Union Admin., Proposed Statement on Subprime Mortgage
Lending, 72 Fed Reg. 1o,533, 10,534 (Mar. 8, 2007).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See Rushton, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 78, at 4; see also
Residential Loan Production- 97o to 2oo6, supra note 79.
107 See U.S. Census Bureau, Table 5, Homeownership Rates for the United
States: 1968 to 2oo8, supra note 84.
108 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., The
Subprime Mortgage Market (May 17, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/bernanke2007o5 17a.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2oo8).
109 See Cole, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 22, at 6.
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mortgage rates continued to climb.1 ° During that time subprime
borrowers who thought to refinance their ARM loans before their
payments reset were learning that they were unable to do so, as
they did not have sufficient equity to qualify for a new loan due
to the slowdown in the housing market."' In addition, subprime
borrowers whose repayment ability was not properly verified by
lenders, due to stated income, low-doc and other nontraditional
features, were unable to afford their new payments and began
defaulting on their ARMS by mid to late 2006.112
.Nevertheless, by the end of 2006 the subprime market had
retracted only slightly with origination volume at $6oo billion and
market share of 20 percent. 113 Alt-A originations, on the other
hand, completed their cycle of highs where they grew from a mere
2 percent and estimated $78 billion in volume in 2003 to 13
percent and estimated $390 billion in volume in 2006."M
However, as housing prices continued to further decelerate
in 2007, subprime borrower delinquencies continued to mount.
Alarmed, consumer advocates, legislators and regulators began
looking for ways to minimize the harm of delinquencies and
foreclosures."' By June 29, .2007, the federal agencies issued a
joint statement on subprime mortgage lending requiring
depository institutions to tighten loosened underwriting
standards. 116 By the third quarter of 2007 total delinquencies on
subprime ARMs had reached i8.8I percent" 7 and the percentage
110 Id.
" See Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys.,
The Subprime Mortgage Market (May 17, 2007), supra note io8.
112 See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY
SURVEY, FOURTH QUARTER 2oo6 at 2 (Mar. 2007) (according to the survey in
the fourth quarter of 2oo6 a total of 14.44% of subprime ARM loans were past
due, almost 3% higher than same quarter of the previous year); see also
Rushton, Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 78, at 5.
113 See Rushton, Hearing on Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 78, at 4.
114 Id. at 4-5; see also Residential Loan Production-197o to 2006, supra
note 79.
11 See, e.g., Hearing on Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 22; see also
Hearing on Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 7.
116 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of Thrift Supervision & Nat'l
Credit Union Admin., Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed.
Reg. 37,569 (July io, 2oo8).
117 See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION ("MBA"), NATIONAL
DELINQUENCY SURVEY, SECOND QUARTER 2008 at ii (June 30, 2o08)
[hereinafter MBA, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY, SECOND QUARTER
2008].
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of subprime ARM loans in foreclosure had reached 10.38
percent. 18 Subprime originations had dropped dramatically to an
estimated $182 billion from $6oo billion a year earlier." 9 The
same was the case for Alt-A mortgages which dropped in 2007 to
a mere $55.5 billion, an 85 percent decline from 2006 level. 20
In a press release on December i8, 2007, the Board
announced its intention to amend Regulation Z, which
implements TILA and HOEPA. 121 The news of the proposed
amendments came as the overall mortgage foreclosure rates
reached an all time high. 2  By the second quarter of 2008, the
percentage of subprime ARM loans in foreclosure had increased
to 19.41 percent 23 and the 2007 all time foreclosure record was
also shattered, as overall foreclosure rates stood at 2.75 percent.
2 4
The events of recent years had taken their toll on the Alt-A and
subprime mortgage markets. In the first quarter of 2008, an
industry survey showed that Alt-A mortgages plummeted 87% to
$7 billion. 2 Similarly, a more recent industry survey of subprime
mortgage lenders found that only an estimated $5 billion of
subprime mortgage loans were originated for the first half of
2008, announcing that the subprime mortgage market had
118 Id.
"I Paul Muolo, New Analysis: '07 Volume Off i5to, National Mortgage
News, Volume 32, Issue 30 (Apr. 28, 2008), available at http://www.national
mortgagenews.com/premium/archive/?id= 159348 (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
120 See Alt-A Plummets by 87%, National Mortgage News, Volume 32,
Issue 26 (Mar. 31, 2oo8), available at http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/
premium/archive/?id= 159078 (last visited Nov. i3, 20o8).
"I Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Request for
Comment on Changes to Regulation Z to Protect Consumers from Unfair or
Deceptive Home Mortgage Lending and Advertising Practices (Dec. i8, 2007),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/200712 18a.htm (last
visited Oct 3, 20o8); Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Proposed Rule
and Request for Public Comment, Regulation Z, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1672 (Jan.
9, 2008).
122 See Les Christie, Foreclosures Hit All-Time High, CNNMoney.com,
Mar. 6, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2oo8/o3/o6/real estate/defaultscontinue
_climb/index.htm?postversion=2oo8o3o6l4 (last visited Nov. 13, 2008); see
also Renae Merle & Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Mortgage Foreclosures Reach All-
Time High, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2oo8 at Di (by the end of 2007 overall
mortgage foreclosure reached 2.04 percent).
123 See MBA, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY, SECOND QUARTER
2OO8, supra note 1'7, at ii.
124 Id. at Io.
,25 Alt-A Plummets by 87%, National Mortgage News, Volume 32, Issue 26
(Mar. 31, 2oo8), available at http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/premium/
archive/?id=159o78 (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
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ii. REVIEW OF TILA AND HOEPA STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY SCHEMES
A. TILA
Congress enacted TILA in 1968 to promote the informed
use of credit by consumers and to increase competition in the
consumer credit market.127 TILA requires creditors to provide
consumers applying for credit with standardized disclosure of
material information, thereby enabling consumers to shop for
terms among creditors and make an informed decision
concerning the credit transaction. 128
The Board was granted exclusive authority to promulgate
regulations and provide interpretations under TILA. 129 The
Board exercised its authority and implemented TILA by its
promulgation of Regulation Z. However, administrative
enforcement responsibilities under TILA, were not granted
exclusively to the Board, but rather were divided among eight
federal regulatory agencies. 130 In addition, the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") was granted general and residual regulatory
authority with regard to creditors not regulated by the other eight
agencies."'
TILA applies to various types of credit transactions and
covers all types of mortgage transactions secured by a consumer's
dwelling.'32 For closed-end mortgage loans, i.e. loans other than
revolving lines of credit or "open-end-credit" loans'33, TILA
requires creditors to disclose various types of key information
regarding the mortgage transaction following consumers' credit
application.' Creditors must disclose, for example: the identity
126 Paul Muolo, Subprime Evaporates, National Mortgage News, Volume
32, Issue 50 (Sep. 22, 2oo8), available at http://www.nationalmortgage
news.com/premium/archive/?id=161466 (last visited Nov. 13, 2oo8).
127 See 15 U.S.C. § i6oi(a) (congressional finding and deceleration of
purpose).
128 15 U.S.C. § i6oi(a).
129 15 U.S.C. § 1604.
130 15 U.S.C. § 607(a).
131 15 U.S.C. § 16O7(c) (these creditors are generally non-depository, state
charted, housing creditors, such as mortgage lenders and mortgage brokers).
132 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 16Q2(h), 1631; 12 C.F.R. § 226.i(c).
133 Also known as Home Equity Line of Credit ("HELOC").
134 15 U.S.C. § 638(b)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 226.I9(a) (TILA disclosures must be
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of the creditor, 3' the amount financed,'36 the finance charges137
and the annual percentage rate ("APR").38 TILA also requires
creditors to provide applicants with disclosure of other material
terms, such as payment schedule,'39 the total of all payments 4 '
and information regarding variable rate transactions for
adjustable rate mortgages ("ARM")."4  Creditors must also
disclose whether the loan carries a prepayment charge or demand
feature.' Using the APR as a benchmark figure, for example,
TILA disclosure allows consumers to comparison shop between
creditors for the most favorable terms and costs.
143
As for consumer credit advertisements, TILA requires
creditors to only advertise terms that they can actually make
available to consumers. 144 When advertizing interest rates, TILA
requires that the advertisement do so in APR and if the APR may
increase after closing the advertisement must state that fact.141 In
addition, the advertising of certain terms, such as the percentage
of down-payment or the amount of any payment, will trigger
additional disclosure requirements to further explain to
consumers the basis of the assumptions made in the
advertisement. 146
In mortgage transactions secured by a consumer's
principal dwelling, TILA gives the consumer a right to rescind
within three business days of i) closing, or ii) the delivery of notice
of right to rescind, or iii) the delivery of all material disclosures,
provided before closing of the loan transaction or within three business days of
receipt of consumer application, whichever is earlier).
135 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(I); 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(a).
136 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(2); I2 C.F.R. § 226.i8(b).
137 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(3); 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(d) (which is the cost of credit
expressed in dollar amount).
13 I5 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(I); 12 C.F.R. § 226.i8(e) (which is the finance
charge or cost of the loan expressed as a yearly rate).
139 i5 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(5); 12 C.F.R. § 226.i8(g) (which is the number,
amount, and due dates of payments scheduled to repay the loan).
140 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(5); 12 C.F.R. § 226.i8(h) (which is the total amount
to be paid by the consumer when all scheduled payments are made).
141 15 U.S.C. § 1638(14); 12 C.F.R. § 226.i9.
1 5 U.S.C. § 1638(11); 2 C.F.R. § 226.18(i) and (k).
143 See CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING, supra note 8,
at 54-55.
14 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 226.24 (pertaining to closed-end credit
advertising).
145 Id.
146 Id.
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whichever occurs last. 147 In addition, in cases of closed-end
mortgage secured by a consumer's principal dwelling, when
creditors fail to provide required material disclosures or notice of
right to rescission, TILA gives the consumer an extended right to
rescind the loan within three years of consummation or upon the
sale of the property, whichever comes first.148
In the event that TILA requirements are violated,
consumers are granted both individual and class, rights of action
and may recover statutory damages, as well as, proven actual
damages and reasonable attorney's fees.149 In addition, TILA has
extended liabilities to assignees of the original creditors.5 0
Moreover, for willful and knowing violations, TILA imposes
criminal penalties of up to $5,000 or up to one year
imprisonment.15
Nevertheless, TILA was only enacted as a consumer credit
cost disclosure act.'52 Thus, it was primarily focused on the
content, quantity, and quality of information disseminated to
consumers, rather than being focused on imposing substantive
prohibitions on lending practices harmful to consumers. 53 The
effects of deregulations in the mortgage market industry in the
i98os 1 54 and the ineffectiveness of the then existing disclosures to
alert unsophisticated consumers to the potential harmful effects
of the credit terms they were getting, was portrayed in anecdotal
reports of abusive lending by unscrupulous lenders who made
unaffordable mortgages to house-rich but credit-poor
borrowers. 5 5 In 1994, Congress responded to these anecdotal
147 15 U.S.C. § 1635; 12 C.F.R., § 226.23(a)(3); see 12 C.F.R. § 226.15 (for
open-end mortgage loans).
148 i5 U.S.C. § 163 5(f).
149 15 U.S.C. § 164o(a).
150 15 U.S.C. § 1641.
151 15 U.S.C. § i6ii.
152 See 15 U.S.C. § i6oi(a).
153 Lisa Keyfetz, The Home Ownership And Equity Protection Act Of 1994:
Extending Liability For Predatory Subprime Loans To Secondary Mortgage
Market Participants, 18 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 151, 173 (2 005).
154 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 198o
("DIDMCA"), Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 5oi(a), 94 Stat. 132, i6i (originally
codified as a note to 12 U.S.C. § I7 3 5f-7, now codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a);
Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982 ("AMTPA"), Garn-St
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 38oi-38o6); see also supra pp. 255-56.
"55 See, e.g., Peter S. Canellos & Gary Chafetz, Foreclosure Comes To
Family After 27 Years In Their Home, BOSTON GLOBE, May 6, i99i, at 6. On
May 6, 1991, the Boston Globe began running a series of newspaper articles
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reports of lending abuse'56 by its enactment of HOEPA157, a
federal predatory lending law.
B. HOEPA
HOEPA was enacted as an amendment to TILA.158 By the
enactment of HOEPA, Congress intended to extend consumers
enhanced protection by setting forth additional disclosure
requirements and by prohibiting certain terms and lending
practices in connection with HOEPA covered transactions. 159
Unlike TILA, which covers all types of credit transaction
secured by a consumer's dwelling, HOEPA only covers a subset
of mortgage transactions that are "high-cost" closed-end mortgage
transactions. 60 Under HOEPA, a high-cost loan is defined as
either first or second lien closed-end mortgage loan, made in
refinance transactions, secured by a consumer's principal
dwelling, if the loan exceeds the rate or fee triggers specified in
Section 32 of regulation Z.161 At the time of the enactment of
HOEPA the rate trigger was io percent above the yield of
about high-cost lending in the in the market for second-mortgages. These
reports acted as the catalyst for state and federal probes into the second-
mortgage business lending practices by companies, such as, Fleet Financial,
Inc., BayBank, Shawmut and Haymarket. See, e.g., Steve Marantz, Loan
Scams Prompted Swift, Varied Response, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, I99I, at
19.
16 See generally Problems in Community Development Banking, Mortgage
Lending Discrimination Redlining, and Home Equity Lending, Hearings
Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, I03rd
Cong. (Feb. 3, 17, 24, 1993); See also Peter S. Canellos, Fleet, Foes Squaring
Off Loan Abuse Hearings To Start, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. I7, 1993, at 6i.
117 See Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act
of 1994, supra note 6.
"I' Id. HOEPA was implemented by the Board throughout 12 C.F.R. pt.
226, Reg. Z. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Regulation Z,
Final Rule, 6o Fed. Reg. 15,463 (Mar. 24, 1995).
159 See 140 Cong. Rec. H 6782, 6784 (Conference Report On H.R. 3474,
Riegle Community Development And Regulatory Improvement Act Of 1994,
H.R., Aug. 4, 1994) [hereinafter Conference Report On H.R. 3474 (Aug. 4,
1994)] (statement by Rep. Gonzalez).
161 See 15 U.S.C. § i6o2(aa); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32. See also Cunningham v.
Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 497 F.3d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 2007). High-cost
HOEPA loans are also generally referred to as "high-cost mortgages", "Section
32 loans", "high-cost loans" or simply "HOEPA loans."
161 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.32. HOEPA does not cover purchase mortgage
transactions, reverse mortgage transactions, or open-end credit plans. I5
U.S.C. § i6o2(aa). See also Cunningham, 497 F.3 d at 717.
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comparable maturity Treasury securities; 162 and the fee trigger
was 8 percent of the total loan amount or $400, whichever is
greater. 163
Creditors making high-cost loans must provide consumers
with additional disclosures to those already mandated by
TILA. 164  HOEPA disclosures are intended to make consumers
fully aware of the terms of the loan they are about to take by
providing key cost disclosures.165 For example, in addition to
APR and monthly payment, the disclosures provide additional
information for high-cost balloon loans and ARMs, such as,
alerting consumers to the amount of any balloon payment and
specifying for ARMs that interest rate and monthly payment may
increase. 6 6 Consumers are also made aware that by taking the
loan they will have a mortgage on their home; and that if they
default on the loan they may lose their home and the money they
have put into it.167 In addition, the disclosures emphasize that
consumers are not required to complete the transaction merely
because they received the disclosures or because they signed a
loan application. 6 ' Another important measure of protection is
HOEPA's "cooling off period" which requires that the disclosures
be provided at least three business days prior to consummation,
to allow consumers more time to consider the transaction or seek
additional advice before closing. 69
HOEPA prohibits certain loan terms and lending practices
deemed harmful to consumers, in connection with loans identified
as high-cost.' For example, a HOEPA covered loan cannot
contain a balloon payment when the loan term is less than 5
years;171 nor can it contain terms causing negative amortization; 72
162 15 U.S.C. § 002(aa)(i)(A). The rate trigger has since been amended and
reduced for first lien position to 8 percent. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(i)(i).
163 5 U.S.C. § i6o2(aa)(i)(B).
164 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c).
165 See Conference Report On H.R. 3474 (Aug. 4, 1994), supra note 159
(statement by Rep.. Gonzalez).
166 5 U.S.C. § I639(a)(2)(B); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.32(c)(3),(4).
167 15 U.S.C. § I39(a)(I)(B); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c)(I).
16 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(I)(A); 12C.F.R. § 226.32(c)(I).
169 15 U.S.C. § 1639(b)(I); 12 C.F.R. § 226.3I(c)(I).
170 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)-6); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.32(d), 226.34.
171 15 U.S.C. § 1639(e); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(i)(i). The regulation provides
a narrow exception for balloon loans with maturity of less than one year, if the
loan is a "bridge" loan made in connection with the acquisition or construction
of the consumer's new principle dwelling. 12 C.F.R. § 226. 3 2(d)(i)(ii).
172 15 U.S.C. §6 3 9 (f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(2). A negative amortization
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or contain terms which can cause the interest rate to rise upon
borrower's default.173 In addition, HOEPA generally prohibits
prepayment penalties for covered loans."' Nonetheless, a high-
cost loan may contain a prepayment penalty if the following
conditions are met: (i) the penalty is for less than 5 years from the
date of consummation; (ii) the source funding the penalty is not a
refinancing by the creditor or an affiliate of the creditor; and (iii)
at consummation the consumer's total monthly debt does not
exceed 50 percent of the consumer's verified monthly gross
income. 175
HOEPA also specifically prohibits certain lending
practices that are harmful to consumers. 76 HOEPA prohibits
creditors from engaging in a pattern or practice of extending
high-cost loans to a consumer without regard to the consumers'
ability to repay the loans. 7 In addition, HOEPA prohibits
creditors from requiring more than two period payments to be
paid in advance at the closing, which tend to increase the loan
amount when payments are financed, thereby further increasing
the cost of the loan;' 78 and prohibits making payments directly to
home improvement contractors without borrower control.179
Creditors who violate HOEPA by including prohibited
terms or engaging in prohibited practices are deemed to have
failed to deliver "material disclosures" required by TILA, thereby
triggering the TILA's extended right of rescission. 80 In addition
to the remedies provided by TILA, HOEPA has increased civil
liabilities for covered loans to an amount equal to the sum of all
finance charges paid by the consumer when creditors fail to
comply with the disclosure requirements, unless the creditors can
show that the failure to comply was not material.' Most
importantly, in an attempt to eliminate the "holder in due course"
defense for covered loans, HOEPA extends liability to subsequent
occurs when the scheduled payments do not cause the full finance charges to
be paid and the unpaid portion of the finance charges is then added to the loan
principle causing the principle to increase.
173 15 U.S.C. § 1639(d); 12 C.F.R. § 226. 3 2(d)(4 ).
174 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c); 12 C.F.R. § 226. 3 2(d)(6).
175 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(7).
176 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1639; 12 C.F.R.'§§ 226.32, 226.34.
177 15 U.S.C. § I6 3 9 (h).
178 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(3).
179 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(I).
180 15 U.S.C. § 16390); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1635(a), (f).
181 15 U.S.C. § 164o(a)(4).
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holders and assignees of the original creditors and requires that
assignees demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a
reasonable person using ordinary due diligence could not have
determined based on the required documentation that the
mortgage was a HOEPA covered loan."2 In addition, the original
creditor must provide a notice to assignees and purchasers stating
that the loan is a HOEPA covered loan and that the assignees
will be subject to claims and defenses that the borrower may
have against the original creditor.8 3 HOEPA also grants States
Attorneys General the power to enforce HOEPA and bring
proceedings within three years of date the violation occurred. 8 4
The Board was given broad and extensive powers under
HOEPA, in addition to its ability to promulgate regulations and
interpretation under TILA.185 Under HOEPA, the Board has the
power to prohibit additional acts and practices in connection with
mortgage loans that the Board finds to be unfair, deceptive or
designed to evade the provisions of HOEPA, 86 as well as to
prohibit abusive lending practices, or practices not in the interest
of borrowers in connection with refinance mortgage loans.'87
While HOEPA does not define what is unfair or deceptive, the
conference report for HOEPA indicates that the Board should
look to the standards employed for determining state unfair and
deceptive trade practices and federal unfair and deceptive
practices under the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA").18
In addition, the Board was given the authority to adjust, as
necessary, the rate trigger for high-cost loans to as low as 8
percent and up to a maximum of i2 percent'89 and to include
additional charges in the fee trigger as the Board deems
appropriate.9
In December 2001 the Board made its first use of its rule
making powers under HOEPA by adopting amendments to
Regulation Z.111 The amendments came as the number of
182 15 U.S.C. § 164i(d)(i).
183 Id.; 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(2).
184 I5 U.S.C. § 1640(e).
185 15 U.S.C. § 1639(l)(2).
186 15 U.S.C. § 163 9 (l)(2)(A).
187 15 U.S.C. § 163 9 (1)(2)(B).
188 See 140 Cong. Rec. H 4442, 6683; 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(I).
189 15 U.S.C. § i6o2(aa)(2)(B).
190 15 U.S.C. § i6o2(aa)(4)(D).
191 See generally Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Regulation Z,
Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604 (Dec. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Regulation Z,
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refinance mortgage loans made in the subprime market had
increased about five-fold from an estimated 138,000 loans in
1994, when HOEPA was enacted, to an estimated 658,000 in
2000.192 As the number of subprime mortgage loans increased so
did the stream of reports of lending abuses. 19 3  Such reports
caused increasing concerns to States which began taking
legislative actions to curb predatory lending in their own
borders.194 The Board, in its December 200i amendments,
attempted to address these issues by further tightening control
over abusive lending by means of bringing more loans under the
coverage of HOEPA.9 5
Effective October 2002, the Board reduced the rate trigger
for first-lien loans from io percent to 8 percent, by bifurcating
HOEPA's original rate trigger and creating two separate rate
triggers, one for first-lien loans and another for subordinate-lien
loans. 196 In addition, the Board included single-premium
insurance in the points and fees trigger calculation.197 These two
changes intended to bring more loans within the coverage of
HOEPA. 9 8
Final Rule (Dec. 20, 2001)].
192 See Memorandum "to the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.
from Gov. Gramlich, Chairman, Comm. on Consumer and Community
Affairs, Amendments to Regulation Z addressing concerns related to predatory
practices in mortgage lending, Nov. 27, 2001, at 7, http://federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/meetings/200 /200I12 12/200I1207-openmemo i.pdf.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 8 n.5 (at the time of the 2oo amendment to Regulation Z, five
states, namely: North Carolina, California, Massachusetts, Illinois and New
York, had enacted statutes addressing high-cost loans).
195 See Regulation Z, Final Rule (Dec. 20, 2001), supra note 191, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 65,6o8 (while OTS data suggested that lowering the APR triggers by 2
percent will increase HOEPA coverage from 1 to 5 percent; trade association
data, however, showed that a 2 percent reduction will increase HOEPA
coverage from 9 to 26 percent for first-lien loans).
196 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(i)(i). While asserting its power to lower the rate
trigger for subordinate-liens loans the Board reasoned that it was only
changing the rate trigger for first-lien loans because most evidence of lending
abuse were in connection with first-lien loans and trade association data
suggested that under the io percent trigger 47 percent of subordinate-lien loans
were already covered by HOEPA. See Regulation Z, Final Rule (Dec. 20,
2001), supra note 191, 66 Fed. Reg. at 65,6o8.
197 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(b)(i)(iv).
198 See Regulation Z, Final Rule (Dec. 20, 2001), supra note 191, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 65,609 (trade association data suggested that the inclusion of single-
premium insurance in the fee trigger with the lower APR trigger will result in
increase in coverage from 26 percent to 38 percent for first-lien loans and from
2008]
LOYOLA CONSUMER LAW REVIEW
The Board also enhanced the protection of HOEPA by
prohibiting additional terms and practices. For example, subject
to specific exceptions, the due-on-demand clause was added to
the list of terms prohibited by HOEPA.19 9 Also, creditors are
prohibited from wrongfully documenting or structuring a loan
secured by consumer's dwelling as an open-end credit plan, as a
mean to evade the coverage of HOEPA.2 ° The amendment
further prohibited the practice of "loan flipping", which is defined
as refinancing a mortgage loan by the same creditor who
extended the mortgage loan within one year of the extension of
the mortgage loan to the consumer and without economic benefit
to the consumer.2 0 1 The Board also clarified the prohibition
regarding equity-based-lending by adding a presumption of
violation when creditors engage in a pattern or practice of
making a high-cost loan without documenting borrowers' ability
to repay. 202
Nevertheless, faced with increasing volumes of subprime
mortgages during the years 2002 to 2005 and mounting concerns
over predatory lending practices, consumer advocates continued
to criticize HOEPA as being a far too limited tool due to its
insufficient coverage of high-cost loans. 3 Critics of HOEPA
pointed out that it does not cover high-cost purchase-money
mortgages, home equity lines of credits, or reverse mortgages. 4
In particular, consumer advocates stressed the need to expand
HOEPA's high-cost definition by further lowering the rate and
fee triggers, including adding the controversial yield spread
premium ("YSP") and other third party charges to the fee
calculations, so as to increase HOEPA's coverage over subprime
mortgage lending.205
47 percent to 61 percent for subordinate-lien loans); see also supra notes 195,
196.
199 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(8).
200 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(b).
201 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(3).
202 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(4); See also Regulation Z, Final Rule (Dec. 20,
2001), supra note 191, 66 Fed. Reg. at 65,614.
203 See, e.g., Protecting Homeowners: Preventing Abusive Lending While
Preserving Access to Credit: Hearing Before the Subcomms. on Fin. Inst. and
Consumer Credit and Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., io8th Cong. 5o-5, (Nov. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Hearing on Protecting
Homeowners] (testimony of Allen J. Fishbein, Director of Hous. and Credit
Policy, Consumer Federation of America).
204 Id.
205 Id. at 277 n.21 (statement by Margot Saunders, National Consumer
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In addition, during that time States' anti-predatory
legislations, which were intended to fill in the gaps left by
HOEPA, were facing preemption challenges by federal banking
regulatory agencies, such as the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency26 and the Office of Thrift Supervision. 27  As more
States across the nation were enacting anti-predatory lending
laws, federally chartered financial institutions were asserting
exemption due to federal preemption from state mortgage
licensing and supervision requirement and declined to be bound
by States' anti-predatory lending laws. 208 Therefore, up until the
end of 2006 the focus of the debate over curbing abusive lending
practices rested primarily on the need to find tailored solutions on
a national level to the issues of predatory and subprime mortgage
lending in the form of a congressional expansion to TILA and
HOEPA. 0 9
C. Recent Federal Action in Response to Concerns Regarding the
Mortgage Market
As the subprime market peaked in 2005 and mortgage
lenders' marketing of nontraditional mortgage products was in
full force, it became evident to federal regulatory agencies that a
more immediate action was needed to protect consumers from
ongoing harmful lending practices. On December 29, 2005,
federal regulatory agencies announced their intention to provide
Law Center).
206 See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bank Activities and
Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, Final Rule (Jan. I3, 2004), 69
Fed. Reg. 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (rules promulgated in this amendment asserted
OCC preemption of State laws as they pertain to mortgage lending operations
of national banks and their subsidiaries, amongst other things); see also
generally GAO PREDATORY LENDING REPORT, supra note io.
207 See, e.g., Office of Thrift Supervision, Preemption of New York
Predatory Lending Law (Jan. 30, 2003), http://files.ots.gslsolutions.com/
56 3 02.pdf.208 See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
201 See, e.g., Legislative Solutions To Abusive Mortgage Lending Practices,
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity and the
Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
Io9th Cong. (May 24, 2005), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/
GPO/LPS75150 [hereinafter Hearing on Legislative Solutions To Abusive
Mortgage Lending Practices] (discussing proposed bills "The Responsible
Lending Act", H.R. 1295, and "The Prohibit Predatory Lending Act", H.R.
1182); see also Hearing on Protecting Homeowners, supra note 203 (discussing
proposed "Responsible Lending Act", H.R. 833).
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guidance to depository institutions regarding the practices of
lending nontraditional products and risk layering.21°  The
agencies were concerned that nontraditional mortgage products
are offered to a wide spectrum of borrowers, including subprime
and Alt-A, who may not otherwise qualify for conventional fixed
rate or ARM products and who may riot fully understand the risk
involved in taking such loans.21'
By early 2006 the Board became concerned due to
continued reports of predatory and mortgage lending abuses. In
a press release on May i, 2006 the Board announced that it
intended to hold hearings under HOEPA in response to reports of
predatory lending practices in the underserved markets 12
Amongst the Board's stated goals for the hearings was to assess
the impact of HOEPA rules on the mortgage market, including
the effectiveness of the amendments made in 2002, in light of
States promulgation of anti-predatory lending laws.213  In
addition, due to the proliferation of nontraditional mortgages, in
particular in the subprime and Alt-A markets, the Board was
interested in learning whether sufficient information was
provided to borrowers about these products and whether
Regulation Z disclosures should be revised.214 Last, the Board
wanted to learn more about the role of mortgage brokers and the
way they are perceived by consumers in the subprime mortgage
market.215 The 2006 hearings were held during the months of
June and July in four cities around the country.216
A few months after the 2006 HOEPA hearings, on
210 See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of Thrift Supervision &
Nat'l Credit Union Admin., Proposed Interagency Guidance on
Nontraditional Mortgage Products, 70 Fed. Reg. 77,249 (Dec. 2 9, 2005).
211 Proposed Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Products,
70 Fed. Reg. at 77,250.
212 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Board to Hold Four Public
Hearings on the Home Equity Lending Market, Press Release, May i, 2oo6
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/2oo6o5oia.
htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2oo8).
213 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.; Home Equity Lending
Market, Notice of Public Hearings, 71 Fed. Reg. 26,513, 26,514 (May 5, 2oo6).
214 71 Fed. Reg. at 26,514-15.
215 71 Fed. Reg. at 26,515-16.
216 June 7, 2oo6, Chi., Ill.; June 9, 2oo6, Phila., Pa; June 16, 2oo6, S.F., Ca;
and July ii, 2oo6, Atlanta, Ga. 71 Fed. Reg. at 26,514. See
http://www.federalreserve.gov/events/publichearings/hoepa/2 oo6/default.htm
(last visited Nov. 13, 2008) (for complete transcripts of the 2oo6 HOEPA
hearings).
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October 4, 2006, the federal regulators had issued their
interagency guidance on nontraditional mortgage products. 217 As
2o06 was near to a close, there was increasing concern that
subprime borrowers were defaulting on their ARM loans and that
more defaults and foreclosures are underway.218 These concerns
began materializing in early 2007 as evidence of subprime ARM
loans defaults and foreclosures began mounting. 19 On March 3,
2007 federal agencies issued proposed comments on an
interagency subprime mortgage lending statement intended to
address concerns that subprime borrowers may not fully
understand the risks and consequences of products marketed to
them.22' The statement also sought to provide additional guidance
to depository institutions regarding the risks involved in
improperly determining subprime borrowers' ability to repay.221
In addition, responding to the ensuing turmoil in the
mortgage market, on May 3, 2007, the Board announced it would
be holding another hearing to explore methods by which it may
use its rulemaking authority under HOEPA to rein in abusive
lending practices.222 Based on the hearings conducted in 2006, the
Board focused its concern on the following mortgage lending
217 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of Thrift Supervision & Nat'l
Credit Union Admin., Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609 (Oct. 4, 2006).
21 See Ellen Schloemer, Wei Li, Keith Ernst, and Kathleen Keest, LOSING
GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THEIR COST TO
HOMEOWNERS, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 7, 15 (Dec. 2oo6),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/CRL-foreclosure-rprt- i-8.pdf
(reported 318,ooo foreclosures filed in the third quarter of 2006 alone-a 43%
increase from third quarter 2005-and further projected that one out of five
subprime loans made in 2005-06 will end in foreclosure).
219 See generally Hearing on Mortgage Market Turmoil, supra note 22; see
also Subprime and Predatory Lending: New Regulatory Guidance, Current
Market Conditions, and Effects on Regulated Financial Institutions: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the Comm. on Fin.
Serv., iio Cong (Mar. 27, 2007), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/
LPS85194.
220 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of Thrift Supervision & Nat'l
Credit Union Admin., Proposed Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72
Fed Reg. 10,533, 10,534 (Mar. 8, 2007).
221 Id.
222 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Board to
Hold Public Hearing Under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
on June 14, 2007 (May 3, 2007) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/pressbcreg/2007oo3a.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
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practices: prepayment penalties, escrows for taxes and insurance
on subprime loans, "stated income" or "low-doc" loans and
consideration of borrower's ability to repay a loan. 3 The 2007
HOEPA hearing was conducted on June 14 in Washington DC.
Shortly following the hearing on June 29, 2007, federal
agencies issued a final Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending
providing guidance on the standards that depository institutions
must follow in evaluating mortgage applications by subprime
borrowers. 4 Nevertheless, due to the fact that the guidance only
covers depository institution, as oppose to- non-depository
mortgage lenders and brokers, and due to consumers' inability to
enforce the guidance provisions and have an effective remedy, the
Board heeded to consumer advocates and legislators' requests
and in a press release on December i8, 2007 announced its
proposed changes to Regulation Z.22 1
Relying on its rulemaking authority under § 1639(l)(2) and
§ 1604(a), the Board's proposed amendments set out to achieve
three goals: (i) prevent unfair, deceptive and abusive acts or
practices in connection with "higher-priced" mortgages and
closed-end credit transactions secured by a consumer's principle
dwelling; (2) improve mortgage disclosures in advertisements for
credit secured by a consumer's dwelling and prohibit deceptive or
misleading practices in connection with closed-end mortgage
advertising; and (3) provide consumers with early disclosures in
closed-end mortgage transactions. 6
III. NEW AMENDMENTS TO REGULATION Z: TOOLS FOR
COMBATING UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE AND ABUSIVE LENDING
On July 14, 2008 the Board announced its approval of
final rules amending Regulation Z.227 The final rules adhere to
223 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Home Equity Lending
Market; Notice of Hearings (May 31, 2oo6), 72 Fed. Reg. 30,38o, 30,382-83.
224 See Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, supra note i 16, 72 Fed.
Reg. 37,569.
225 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Request for
Comment on Changes to Regulation Z to Protect Consumers from Unfair or
Deceptive Home Mortgage Lending and Advertising Practices (Dec. 18, 2007)
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/2oo7 i2 8a.
htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2oo8).
226 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Regulation Z, Proposed
Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1673 (Jan. 9, 2008).
227 See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Board
Issues Final Rule Amending Home Mortgage Provisions of Regulation Z,
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goals set out to be achieved in the proposed amendments.2 The
new rules are comprised of seven new consumer protections
relating to mortgage lending, servicing and advertising practices,
as well as, additional disclosure enhancements and
requirements.229 The Board adopted the new protections pursuant
to its rulemaking authority under HOEPA,3 0 while adopting
disclosure enhancements and requirements pursuant to its
general rulemaking authority under TILA.211 The new rules
added two new sections, §§ 226.35 and 226.36, and amended
several provisions throughout Regulation Z. 23 2 The new rules will
become effective October i, 2009, except for the requirements
pertaining to escrows that will become effective on April i,
2010.233
A. New Category of Higher-Priced Mortgage Loans ("HPML")
Addressing its first goal of preventing unfair, deceptive
and abusive acts or practices in connection with "higher-priced"
mortgages and closed-end credit transactions secured by a
consumer's principle dwelling, the Board, pursuant to its rule
making authority under HOEPA, finalized four prohibitions for a
newly defined category of "higher-priced mortgage loan"
("HPML").3  Although the Board's adopted category is
substantially the same as proposed in terms of coverage,
following public comments the Board opted to change its
proposed definition for this category. 23 The Board changed its
proposed benchmark of yield of comparable Treasury securities
.and substituted it with a benchmark of "average prime offer rate"
("APOR") of a comparable transaction. 23 The APOR benchmark
will be derived from the average interest rates, points and fees
currently offered to consumers by a representative sample of
creditors for mortgage transactions having low-risk
supra note i.
22 73 Fed. Reg. at 1673.
229 See generally 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
230 I5 U.S.C. 639(1)(2).
231 15 U.S.C. 604(a).
232 See generally 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522.
233 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,595.
234 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,603; 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(a)(i) [effective Oct. i, 2009].
235 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,534.
236 Id.; 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,603; 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(a)(2) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
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characteristics. 237 According to the Board, at least initially, the
APOR will be derived from Freddie Mac's Weekly Primary
Mortgage Market Survey ("PMMS"),238 which publishes weekly
average rates, points and fees for four types of mortgage
programs: (i) "3o-Year Fixed Rate Mortgage"; (2) "15-Year Fixed
Rate Mortgage"; (3) "5/I-Year ARM"; and (4) "i-Year ARM".239
The Board will use the information contained in the PMMS to
calculate an average APR for each of the loan programs
contained in the PMMS, as well as for other types of mortgage
programs not contained in the PMMS. 24° The Board will then
publish the derived APORs in a table on the internet at least on a
weekly basis, which will indicate how to identify a comparable
transaction to facilitate compliance.241
Due to making changes to the benchmark, the Board had
also modified the initially proposed thresholds of 3 percent for
first-lien and 5 percent for subordinate-liens and substituted them
with thresholds of I.5 percentage points for first-lien and 3.5
percentage points for subordinate-liens, to better reflect coverage
under the new benchmark.242 The amendment requires creditors
to use the date the rate is locked for the final time before
consummation, rather than the application date as the timing
mechanism to check the benchmark APOR and add the threshold
to determine whether the loan is an HPML. 243
Accordingly, the Board's definition for the new category
of HPML is: (i) a consumer credit transaction; (2) secured by the
consumer's principle dwelling; (3) with an APR that exceeds the
APOR for a comparable transaction; (4) as of the date the interest
rate is set; (5) by: (i) 1.5 percentage point for closed-end mortgage
loans secured by a first-lien; or (ii) 3.5 percentage points for
closed-end mortgage loans secured by a subordinate-liens. 44
The new HPML category covers a broad range of
237 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,603; 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(a)(2) [effective Oct. I, 2009].
238 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,534.
239 See generally http://www.freddiemac.com/dlink/html/PMMS/display/
PMMSOutputYr.jsp (last visited Nov. I3, 2008).
240 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,535-36.
241 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,535, 44,603; 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(a)(2) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
242 73 Fed. Reg. at 44536.
243 73 Fed. Reg. at 44537.
244 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,603; 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.35(a)(I), 226.35(a)(3) [effective
Oct. I, 2009].
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transactions, including, home purchase loans,245 refinancing246
and home equity loans.247 Excluded from the new definition of
HPML are248: (i) mortgage loans for the initial construction of the
dwelling; (2) temporary or "bridge" mortgage loans with terms of
twelve months or less;249 (3) reverse-mortgage transactions; and
(4) home equity lines of credit.
B. New Consumer Protections Applicable to HPMLs
New Section 226.35 creates four new protections for
consumers by prohibiting creditors making HPMLs from
engaging in the following practices: (i) making HPML based on
the value of the consumer's collateral in the dwelling without
regard to the consumer's ability to repay as of consummation; (2)
including a prepayment penalty in HPML, except under specific
conditions; (3) making a first-lien HPML without establishing an
escrow account for payment of property taxes and premiums for
mortgage related insurance required by the creditor; or (4)
structuring a home-secured loan as an open-end plan to evade the
prohibitions applicable to HPMLs °  Section 226.35 new
prohibitions were adopted by the Board under its HOEPA
rulemaking powers.25'
i. Prohibition on Disregarding Consumer's Ability to Repay
The final rules prohibit creditors from making HPMLs
based on collateral without verifying the consumer's ability to
repay as required by Section 226.34(a)(4) as amended by the final
rules. 52  Current Section 226.34(a)(4), implementing TILA
245 See 15 U.S.C. § 16o2(w) ("residential mortgage transaction"); 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.2(a)(24).
246 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.2o(a); see also 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 Supplement I para.
2o(a) (Refinancings).
247 The term "home equity loan" is not specifically defined in Regulation Z.
It generally means a mortgage loan where the borrower's equity in the
dwelling is used as collateral for the loan, and could be a first-lien or
subordinate lien. Although, generally the term refers to a subordinate-lien.
248 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,603; 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(a)(3) [effective Oct. i, 2009].
249 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,603; 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(a)(3) [effective Oct. i, 2009]
("a loan to purchase a new dwelling where the consumer plans to sell a current
dwelling within twelve months").
250 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,603-04.
25 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,539; 15 U.S.C. § 1639(l)(2).
252 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,603; 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.35(b)(I), 226.34(a)(4) [effective
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Section 129(h),253 prohibits creditors from engaging in a pattern or
practice of making loans based on collateral without regard to the
consumer's ability to repay when making HOEPA covered high-
cost loans. 4 The Board, using its authority under HOEPA,
amended Section 2 2 6.34(a)(4) in three ways.255
First, the new rule removes the "pattern or practice"
condition in the current rule, which was a major consumer
obstacle for enforcing the provision.2 6  Accordingly, the new
amendment prohibits creditors from extending HOEPA covered
high-cost loans without verifying the consumer's ability to repay
as of consummation. 2
57
Second, in addition to the prohibition, the final rules
explicitly require creditors to verify a consumer's ability to repay
under Section 226.34(a)(4) and provides the following method by
which this requirement is met: a creditor must verify the current
or expected income or assets that it relies upon in determining the
consumer's ability to repay using the consumer's tax returns, IRS
Form W-2, payroll receipts, financial institution statements, or
other reasonably reliable third-party evidence of the consumer's
income or assets. 258 Nevertheless, if a creditor fails to verify
income or asset as required, it may still raise an affirmative
defense showing that the income or assets relied upon were not
"materially greater", than what the creditor could have verified
complying with the requirement.2 59 In addition, the amendment
explicitly requires that creditors verify the consumer's current
obligations. 6 °
Third, the final rules removed the initially proposed
presumption of violation and substituted it with a modified
presumption of compliance with Section 226.34(a)(4).261 The
Oct. I, 2009].
253 15 U.S.C. § I6 3 9 (h).
214 See 12 C.F.R. 226.34(a)(4) [effective until Oct. i, 2009].
255 15 U.S.C. § 163 9 (l)(2)(A).
256 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(4) [effective until Oct. i, 2009].
257 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,543, 44,603; 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(4) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
258 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,546, 44,603; 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(4)(ii)(A) [effective
Oct. I, 2009].
259 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,546, 44,548, 44,603; 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(4)(ii)(B)
[effective Oct. i, 2009].
260 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,546, 44,603; 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(4)(ii)(C) [effective
Oct. i, 2009].
261 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,548; 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(4)(iii) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
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revised presumption of compliance is a closed list of underwriting
procedures, and it arises if the creditor satisfies three
requirements: (i) verifies the consumer's ability to repay under
Section 226.34(a)(4)(ii);262 (2) determines the consumer's ability to
repay using the largest scheduled payment of principle and
interest in the first seven years following consummation and
taking into account current obligations and mortgage-related
obligations;2 63 and (3) assesses the consumer's ability to repay by
using at least one of the following measures: debt-to-income ratio,
or the income the consumer will have remaining after paying
debt obligations.264 The presumption of compliance, however, will
not be available for a transaction in which the regularly
scheduled payments for the first seven years will cause the
principle balance of the mortgage loan to increase, i.e. will cause
negative amortization and eventually'a balloon payment; or the
term of the mortgage loan is less than seven years and the regular
scheduled payments in the aggregate do not fully amortize the
outstanding principle balance, i.e. will cause a balloon payment
at the end of the term.2 65
Accordingly, by incorporating by reference the prohibition
and requirements of Section 226.34(a)(4), as newly amended,
Section 226.35(b)(I) substantiates its prohibition and extends the
new prohibitions and requirements for HOEPA covered loans to
the newly defined category of HPMLs.266
2. Prohibition on Prepayment Penalties
Prepayment penalties on HPMLs are prohibited by the
new rules, unless certain conditions are complied with. Issued
under the Board's HOEPA rulemaking authority, the final rules
are substantially different and provide additional consumer
protection than the proposed rules, specifically in relation to the
condition allowing exception from the prepayment penalty
prohibition. The proposed rules made the prepayment penalty-
262 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,548; 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(4)(iii)(A) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
263 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,548-49; 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(4)(iii)(B) [effective Oct.
I, 2009].
264 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,549; 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(4)(iii)(C) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
265 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,549; 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(4)(iv) [effective Oct. 1,
2009].
266 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,603; 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.35(b)(I) [effective Oct. i, 2009].
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conditions for HOEPA covered loans applicable to HPMLs.267 In
contrast, in crafting the final rules the Board revised the proposed
conditions for HPMLs and at the same time revised and
expanded the current conditions for HOEPA covered loans.268
Under the final rules, HPMLs may contain prepayment
penalties provided that it is permitted by law, including
prepayments allowed by HOEPA, and under the term of the
loan: (i) the penalty will not apply after two-years following
consummation; (2) the penalty will not apply if the source of the
funds for paying the prepayment is a refinancing by the creditor
or an affiliate; (3) and the amount of the scheduled payments may
not change for four-year following consummation.269 In a similar
fashion, the Board revised the current exceptions from the
prohibition on prepayment penalty for HOEPA covered loans, to
allow prepayment penalties only if under the term of the loan, the
above conditions are met, as well as, if at consummation the
consumer's total debt-to-income ratio, as verified under the
newly amended Section 226.34(a)(4)(ii), does not exceed 50
percent.270
3. Prohibition on Making HPMLs without Escrows for Taxes
and Insurance
The new rules prohibit a creditor from extending a HPML
secured by a first-lien without establishing an escrow account
before consummation for payment of property taxes and
premiums for mortgage-related insurance required by the
creditor. 27 1 The rule was adopted, by and large, as proposed and
it was adopted pursuant to the Board rulemaking authority under
HOEPA.272  Unlike other provisions of final rules, the
requirements for escrows will become effective April i, 2010,
except for loans secured by first liens on manufactured housing
for which it will become effective on October i, 2 010.273
267 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,551.
268 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,555.
269 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,555-56, 44,603; 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(b)(2) [effective
Oct. I, 2009].
270 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,555-57, 44,603; 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(7) [effective
Oct. i, 2009].
271 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,559, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(b)(3)(i) [effective Apr.
I, 2010].
272 15 U.S.C. § 1639(1)(2).
273 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,562.
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The final rules provide exemption from escrow
requirements for loans secured by shares in a cooperative 274 and a
partial exemption for condominiums from escrows of insurance
premiums if the condominium association requires unit owners to
pay premiums to a master homeowners' insurance policy
covering all units in the condominium. 7 s In addition, the final
rules allows creditors or servicers to permit a consumer to cancel
the escrow account upon consumer written request to cancel,
provided that the request is not received earlier than 365 days
after consummation. 276
4. Anti-Evasion Provision
Because the coverage of HPMLs does not include home
equity lines of credit or open-end plans,277 the Board pursuant to
its rulemaking authority under HOEPA, prohibits creditors from
structuring a loan, secured by consumer's principle dwelling that
do not meet the definition of open-end credit, as an open-end
plan, in order to evade the prohibitions on HPMLs118
C. New Protections for Closed-End Mortgages Secured by
Consumer Principle Dwelling
As an integral part of the Board's first goal, the provisions
of new Section 226.36 are aimed at preventing unfair and
deceptive practices in connection with mortgage lending and
servicing. Unlike the provisions of Section 2 26.35, which are only
applicable to HPMLs, new Section 226.36 provides new
protections to all types of closed-end mortgages secured by the
consumer's principle dwelling.279 Yet, similar to the prohibitions
in connection with HPMLs, these new provisions were adopted
274 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,561, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. § 226. 3 5(b)(3 )(ii)(A) [effective
Apr. I, 2010].
275 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,561, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(b)(3)(ii)(B) [effective
Apr. I, 2010].
276 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,56o, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(b)(3)(iii) [effective
Apr. 1, 2010].
277 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,603; 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(a)(3) [effective Oct. i, 2009].
278 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,563, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(b)(4 ) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
279 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,563, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.36, 226.36(d) [effective
Oct. I, 2009].
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by the Board under its HOEPA rulemaking authority. 28 ° The
new final rules of Section 226.36 generally prohibit: (i) creditors
or mortgage brokers from coercing, influencing, or encouraging
an appraiser to misstate or misrepresent an appraisal; and (2)
servicers from engaging in unfair servicing practices. 81
Departing from the proposed amendments, the final rule did not
adopt the prohibition of payments to a mortgage broker by a
creditor beyond the amount a consumer agreed to in advance a
broker would receive,282 or the proposed requirement of servicers
to provide consumers with a written schedule of fees and charges
within reasonable time upon a consumer's request.
283
i. New Prohibition on Coercing Appraisers
The final rules prohibit creditors or mortgage brokers
from coercing, influencing or encouraging an appraiser to
misstate or misrepresent the value of a consumer's principle
dwelling in connection with, a consumer credit transaction
secured by such dwelling.284 In addition, the new rule includes a
subset provision prohibiting a creditor from extending credit
secured by consumer's principle dwelling if it has knowledge, at
or before consummation, that an appraiser was coerced,
influenced or otherwise encouraged to misrepresent or misstate
the value of the dwelling. 5 This prohibition is in effect unless
the creditor can document that it acted with reasonable diligence
to determine that the appraisal does not materially misstate or
misrepresent the value of the dwelling.28 6
The final rules pertaining to coercion of appraisers were
adopted substantially as proposed. To enforce the new
prohibition, the Board had to create new definitions for
"appraiser" and "mortgage broker", terms previously not defined
in Regulation Z. According to the new definition a "mortgage
broker" is a person, other than an employee of a creditor, who for
280 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,563, 44,566, 44,571.
281 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,563.
282 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,563-65.
283 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,570.
284 73 Fed.- Reg. at 44,566-67, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(b)(i) [effective
Oct. i, 2009].
285 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,568, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(b)(2) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
286 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,568, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(b)(2) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
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compensation or gain, or expectation of compensation or gain,
arranges, negotiates, or obtains extension of credit for another
person. 87  The definition further provides that the term
"mortgage broker" includes a person meeting the definition even
if the consumer credit obligation is initially. payable to such
person, for example in table funded transactions, unless that
person actually provides the funds for the transaction at
consummation. 8 The new term "appraiser" means a person who
is in the business of assessing the value of dwellings, and includes
persons who employ, refer, or manage an appraiser and affiliates
of such persons. 89
Moreover, the new rules provide a non-exhaustive list of
five examples of actions by a creditor or mortgage broker that
violate the prohibition of coercing appraisers: (i) implying to the
appraiser retention of services, either current or future, depends
on the amount at which the appraiser values a consumer's
principle dwelling; (2) excluding an appraiser from being
considered for future engagement because the value of a
consumer's dwelling the appraiser reported does not meet or
exceed a minimum threshold; (3) telling an appraiser the
minimum appraised value of a consumer principle dwelling
needed to approve the loan; (4) not compensating an appraiser
because the appraised value of a consumer's dwelling was not at
or above a certain amount; and (5) conditioning the compensation
of an appraiser on the consummation of the loan.290
Similarly, the new rules provide a non-exhaustive list of
five examples of actions by a creditor or mortgage broker that
would not violate the prohibition of coercing appraisers,
including: (i) asking an appraiser to consider additional
information about comparable properties or about a consumer's
principle dwelling; (2) asking that the appraiser provide
additional information regarding the basis of a valuation; (3).
asking that an appraiser correct factual errors in the appraisal
report; (4) obtaining multiple appraisers on of a consumer's
principle dwelling, provided that the creditor adheres to a policy
of selecting the most reliable appraisal, rather than the appraisal
that has the highest value; and (5) taking action permitted or
287 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,565, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(a) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
288 Id.
289 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,604; 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(b)(3) [effective Oct. 1, 2009].
290 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,567, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. § 226. 3 6(b)(i)(i) [effective Oct.
I, 2009].
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required by law.29" '
2. New Prohibition on Unfair Servicing
The final rules prohibit unfair fees and servicing practices
in connection with closed-end consumer credit transactions
secured by a consumer's principle dwelling.292 For the final rules,
promulgated under the Board's HOEPA rulemaking authority,
the Board adopted three of the proposed unfair servicing
practices, while deciding against prohibiting servicers from
failing to provide a schedule of servicing fees and charges within
a reasonable time of request.293 For the purpose of prohibiting
unfair servicing practices, the Board adopted by reference the
terms "servicer" and "servicing" as defined by Section 3 500.2(b) of
Regulation X, which implement Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act ("RESPA"). 294
Accordingly, the final rules prohibit servicers from:. (i)
failing to credit a payment as of the date of receipt, except when
the delay does not result in any charges to the consumer or in
reporting of negative information to credit reporting agencies,
except when a payment is made that does not conform to the
servicer's reasonable payment requirements;2  (2) imposing late
fees or delinquency charges on a payment, due to late fee or
delinquency charge assessed on prior payment, if the payment is
paid as agreed;296 or (3) failing to provide an accurate statement of
the total outstanding balance required to satisfy the obligation as
of a specified date, i.e. payoff statement, within reasonable time
after receiving a request from or on behalf of a consumer.297
.The rules also provide that if a servicer specifies to the
consumer in writing reasonable requirements for making
291 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,568, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. § 226. 3 6(b)(i)(ii) [effective Oct.
I, 2009].
292 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,570, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(d) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
29' 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,570.
294 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,570, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(c)(3) [effective Oct. i,
2oo9]; Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 26Ol-2617;
Regulation X, 24 C.F.R. § 3500.2(b).
295 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,570, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.36(c)(i)(i), 226.36(c)(2)
[effective Oct. i, 2009].
296 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,570, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(c)(i)(ii) [effective Oct.
i, 2009].297 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,570, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(c)(i)(iii) [effective
Oct. I, 2009].
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payments, but accepts payments that do not conform to the
requirement, the servicer must credit the payment to the
consumer loan account within five days.2 19 This requirement is
directed at remedying the results of instances where servicers
accept the payment from a consumer yet fail to timely credit the
account on the grounds that the consumer did not follow its
payment procedures, which could also result in late payment
being reported on the consumer's credit report.
D. New Consumer Protections in Mortgage Advertising
Addressing its second goal of improving mortgage
disclosures in advertisements for credit secured by a consumer's
dwelling and prohibit deceptive or misleading practices in
connection with closed-end mortgage advertising, the Board
revamped and expanded the rules pertaining to mortgage
advertising disclosures in the new amendments. The Board
addressed this task in two broad ways: first, by prohibiting
certain acts or practices in advertisements for closed-end
mortgage loans pursuant to its rule making authority under
HOEPA; and second, by revamping and expanding rules
governing advertising disclosures practices for both closed-end
and open-end credit in accordance with its general rulemaking
authority under TILA.2 99 This part will cover the new prohibited
acts or practices for closed-end mortgages advertizing and will
provide an overview of the amendments made for closed-end
mortgage advertisement disclosure requirements.
i. New Prohibited Acts and Practice for Closed-End Mortgage
Advertising
Under its HOEPA rulemaking authority, the Board
adopted, substantially as proposed, new Subsection 226.24(i),
which prohibits seven acts or practices in advertisements for
closed-end mortgages as unfair and deceptive."° First, the final
rule prohibits using the word "fixed" rate or payment in an
298 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,571, 44,604; 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(c)(2) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
299 See generally 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,574-90, 44,599-602; see 12 C.F.R. §
226.6 [effective Oct. i, 2009] (for amendments regarding open-end credit
advertising disclosures); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.24 [effective Oct. i, 2009] (for
amendments regarding closed-end credit advertising disclosures).
300 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,586.
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advertisement for a variable rate mortgage or a mortgage where
the payment will increase.3 10 However, the rule permits the use of
the word "fixed" in advertisements for variable rate or payments
provided that the advertisement clearly discloses that it refers to a
variable-rate mortgage and that the time duration for which the
payment or rate will be fixed will be disclosed as closely to the
fixed statement and be equally prominent.0 2 Second, the rule
prohibits comparing in an advertisement between an actual or
hypothetical rate or payment and an advertised rate or payment,
where the advertised rate or payment compared will not be
available for the full duration of the loan.0 3
The third prohibition is regarding advertisement stating
that the product offered is a "government loan program",
"government sponsored loan", or otherwise sponsored or
endorsed by a federal or state government entity, unless the
advertised product is in fact endorsed or sponsored by a federal
or state government entity, such as FHA or VA loans.30 4 Fourth,
the rule prohibits using the name of the consumer's current
lender by an advertisement that was not sent by or on behalf of
the consumer's current lender, unless the advertisement in equal
prominence discloses the name of the person or creditor making
the advertisement and states in a clear and conspicuous manner
that the person making the advertisement is not associated with
or acting on behalf of the consumer's current lender.3 5
Fifth, the rule prohibits making misleading claims in an
advertisement that the product offers debt elimination or results
in a waiver or forgiveness of a consumer's existing obligations to
another creditor.30 6 Sixth, the rule prohibits using the term
"counselor" in an advertisement when referring to a for-profit
mortgage broker or creditor involved in offering, originating, or
3' 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,586-87, 44,602; 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(i)(I) [effective Oct.
I, 2009].
302 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,588, 44,602; 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(i)(I)(i) [effective Oct.
I, 2009].
303 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,587-88, 44,602; 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(i)(2) [effective Oct.
i, 2009] (the subsection however allows advertised payment comparisons if
additional requirements of the subsection are met.); 12 C.F.R. §§
226.24(i)(2)(i),(ii) [effective Oct. I, 2009].
304 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,489, 44,602; 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(i)(3) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
305 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,489, 44,602; 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(i)(4) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
306 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,489, 44,602; 12C.F.R. § 226.24(i)(5) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
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selling mortgages.3"7  Seventh and last, the rule prohibits
providing, in a foreign language advertisement, only information
about a trigger term or required disclosure, such as initial rate or
payment, in the foreign language but providing other required
disclosures and trigger terms in English, in the same
advertisement.08
2. Overview of Advertising Rules for Closed-End Mortgage
Loans
Apart from prohibiting unfair and deceptive advertising
acts or practices the final rules amend the requirements for
closed-end mortgage advertising in two additional and significant
ways. First, the final rules add a clear and conspicuous standard
that is applied for all closed-end credit, including closed-end
mortgages.30 9 The new requirement provides an important
framework for clarifying how the clear and conspicuous standard
should apply to advertising disclosures.310
Second, the final rule amended the regulation adding a
new provision Subsection 226.24(f) to address disclosures of rates
and payments for closed-end mortgages other than for television
or radio advertisements.311 The new provisions of Subsection
226.2 4 (f) are designed to ensure that advertisements adequately
disclose all rates or payments that will apply over the term of the
loan and the time period for which those rates and payments will
apply. 12 For example, the new rules prohibit an advertisement
for a variable rate mortgage loan from disclosing a "teaser" rate
or an interest rate lower than the rate at which interest is
accruing.313 In addition, the new provisions require that such an
advertisement disclose the APR and one or more simple annual
rates of interest, which for variable rate loans are fully indexed
307 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,489-90, 44,602; 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(i)(6) [effective Oct.
i, 2009].
308 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,490, 44,602; 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(i)(7) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
309 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,580, 446oi; 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(b) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
310 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,58o.
311 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,583, 44,6Ol-02; 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(f ) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
312 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,6oi-02; 12 C.F.R. §§ 226'.24(f)(2),(3) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
313 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,6oi; 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.24(c), 226.24(f)(2) [effective
Oct. I, 2009].
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rates.314
In addition, the final rules add an alternative disclosure
provisions for television and radio advertisements, providing a
framework for compliance for such advertising mediums with the
general advertising disclosure requirements. 15 Last, the rules add
a disclosure requirement for advertisements distributed through
paper or internet for closed-end mortgages secured by a
consumer's principle dwelling that state the loan may exceed the
fair market value of the property.316 The new provisions require
such advertisements disclose the tax implications of such
transactions, such as that the interest on the portion that exceeds
the fair market value of the property is not deductible for federal
income tax.317
E. New Early Disclosures for Closed-End Mortgage Loans
Addressing its third and final goal of providing consumers
with early disclosures in closed-end mortgage transactions, the
Board, pursuant to its general rulemaking authority under
TILA, 311 adopted an early disclosure requirement for all closed-
end mortgage loans secured by a consumer's principle dwelling.
The new rules amend the current requirements that early
mortgage transaction-specific disclosures be provided only in
primary residence purchase-money mortgage transactions.319
The new amendments require that in a closed-end
mortgage transaction subject to RESPA and secured by a
consumer's principle dwelling, a creditor provide good faith
estimates of required disclosures to a consumer either before
credit is extended, or shall be delivered not later than three
business days after the creditor receives the consumer's written
application, whichever is earlier.320 Accordingly, the early
disclosure requirements are triggered by the date a creditor
314 Id.
315 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,585, 44,602; 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(g) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
316 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,585, 44,602; 12 C.F.R. § 226.2 4 (h) [effective Oct. i,
2009].
317 Id.
318 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,591; 15 U.S.C. § 16o4(a).
319 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,59; 12 C.F.R. § 226.i9(a)(i) [effective until Oct. i,
2009].
320 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,591, 44,6oo; I2 C.F.R. § 226.i9(a)(i)(i) [effective Oct.
I, 2009].
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receives the consumer's mortgage application.32'
The new rules further prohibit a creditor or any other
person from imposing any fee on the consumer before the
consumer receives the required early disclosures,322 except that a
creditor or other person may impose a fee that is bona fide and
reasonable in amount for obtaining the consumer's credit
report.3
IV. DISCUSSION OF KEY ISSUES IN THE NEW AMENDMENTS AND
THEIR IMPACT ON CONSUMERS IN THE MORTGAGE MARKET
Recent events in the subprime and Alt-A mortgage
markets and their added affect to the turmoil in both the U.S. and
global credit markets highlight the enormously important and
commendable task the Board undertook in amending Regulation
Z. The breadth of the new amendments is extensive and the
Board's approach in crafting the provisions was innovative. The
resulting final rules underscore the important role of public
discourse in shaping future policy of consumer protection. In
particular, the HOEPA mandated hearing process was a great
source of ideas and balancing considerations which ultimately
assisted the Board in tightening control over unfair, deceptive
and abusive mortgage lending practices.
A. The Board's Use of its HOEPA Powers
In taking this regulatory action the Board made extensive
use of its broad powers under HOEPA. 24 Specifically, in
increasing coverage to mortgage transactions beyond refinancing,
the Board had to rely on its authority under Section 163 9 (l)(2)(A),
which empowers the Board to prohibit acts or practices in
connection with mortgage loans in general that the Board finds
unfair, deceptive or intended to evade HOEPA's prohibitions. 5
Pursuant to this power, the Board may prohibit any acts or
practices, taken by anyone not just creditors, in connection with
mortgage loans that are unfair or deceptive.
321 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,594.
322 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,59I, 44,6oo-ol; 12 C.F.R. § 226.i9(a)(i)(ii) [effective
Oct. I1, 2009].
323 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,591, 44,6oi; 12 C.F.R. § 226.I9(a)(I)(iii) [effective
Oct. I, 2009].
324 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,528-29.
32s 15 U.S.C. § 1639(1)(2).
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HOEPA, however, does not define a standard for what is
unfair or deceptive, rather, according to the Conference Report
on HOEPA, the joint explanatory statement of the committee of
the conference indicates that in determining what is unfair or
deceptive the Board should look to the standards of interpreting
state unfair and deceptive trade practices acts and to the standard
use under the FTCA Section 45(a)(i)."' Under the FTCA Section
45(n) unfair acts or practices are defined as those: (i) causing or
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers; (2) which are not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves; and (3) are not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition. 327 Furthermore, in determining whether an act or
practice is unfair, established public policies may be taken into
consideration although they may not be primarily relied on for
unfairness determination.32
While it is beyond the scope of this piece to evaluate each
of the new prohibitions in accordance with these standards, a
general observation is offered. Industry commentators have
suggested that practices such as prepayment penalties, no escrows
or "low-doc" or "no-doc" loans are not inherently unfair or
deceptive 9.3 2 These commentators thus argued that the use of
HOEPA rulemaking powers should be reserved for cases where
practices are clearly unfair, deceptive or abusive. 3 0 However, the
new prohibited practices adopted by the Board were only
prohibited in connection with HPMLs because these practices
were developed to facilitate making higher cost mortgage loans to
high risk borrowers in the subprime market. The mandate
provided to the Board, as indicated by the Conference Report on
HOEPA, was made with the recognition that the Board may
need to prohibit new products and practices developed to
facilitate reverse redlining. Reverse redlining are unfair,
deceptive and abusive practices targeted at low-income,
minorities and vulnerable communities. 331 Research has shown
326 140 Cong. Rec. H at 6683.
327 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
328 Id.
329 Mortgage Bankers Association, Comments in Response to the Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve's Proposed Rule Amending Reg. Z 52 (Apr. 8,
2oo8), http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/News/InternalResource/617 76_
MBAHOEPACommentsLetter.pdf.
330 Id.
331 See CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING, supra note 8,
at 72.
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that subprime borrowers are primarily comprised of low-income,
minorities and vulnerable communities and are most likely to get
mortgage loans at higher cost. 32  Therefore, by prohibiting
practices developed to facilitate higher cost subprime mortgage
lending, the Board's rulemaking action falls within its mandate
to prohibit practices that facilitate reverse redlining.
B. Consumer Remedies for Newly Prohibited Practices
By adopting the prohibited practices in connection with
HPMLs under § 226.35, all closed-end mortgages under § 226.36
and advertising under § 226.24(i) pursuant to the Board's
HOEPA authority under § 1639(l)(2), the Board has extended to
consumers the remedies afforded under HOEPA for violations of
these prohibitions.333 Accordingly, a consumer who timely brings
action against a creditor or assignee for violation of these
prohibitions may be able to recover proven actual damages,
statutory damages and attorney's fees, as well as, HOEPA special
statutory damages equal to the amount of finance charges and
fees paid by the consumer, unless the creditor can show that the
failure to comply was not material.334
Moreover, as the prohibitions were adopted under the
Board's HOEPA authority, failure to comply with the
prohibition constitutes a failure to deliver "material disclosures"
for rescission purposes. 33  Although, the right of rescission
generally does not apply to purchase-money mortgages,
construction loans, or certain refinance consolidations with the
same creditor. 33 The current scope of the term "material
disclosures" for the purpose of rescission under TILA is defined
in Section 226.23(a)(3), footnote 48.337 Material disclosures
include required disclosures of APR, the finance charge, the
amount financed, the total payments, the payment schedule, as
well as, the disclosures and limitations in Section 226.32 (c) and
(d).33s Thus, according to current footnote 48, HOEPA prohibited
332 Id. at 35-37, 72.
113 73 Fed. Reg. at 1716.
334 I5 U.S.C. §§ 1640(a), 164i(a).
33' 73 Fed. Reg. at 17,7; i5 U.S.C. §§ 1639(J), 635(a), (f).
336 15 U.S.C. § 1635(e); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(f).
337 12C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) n.48 [effective until Oct. I, 2009]. Under Reg. Z
rules of construction, footnotes have the same legal effect as the text of the
regulation. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(b)(4).
338 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) n.48 [effective until Oct. i, 2009].
2008]
LOYOLA CONSUMER LAW REVIEW
practices and required disclosures are all included within the
term "material disclosures."''  The Board in the final rules
amended footnote 48 by adding to the existing definition of
"material disclosures" only the newly prohibited prepayment
penalties practice in connection with HPMLs.14° Therefore,
consumers may bring claims for rescission for violations of the
prohibited prepayment practice in connection with HPMLs, as
long as they are not made in mortgage transactions specifically
exempt from the rescission remedy of TILA.341
D. Prohibited Practices in Connection with HPMLs
Taking an innovative approach in focusing protection
efforts on the subprime and higher-cost Alt-A markets, the Board
crafted a new category of "high price mortgage loan" ("HPML").
Measuring the loan APR against a newly created "average prime
offer rate" ("APOR") benchmark plus thresholds of 1.5 and 3.5
percentage points for first and subordinate liens respectively, the
new rules divide the mortgage market into three types of loan
categories: (i) HOEPA high-cost loans or Section 32 loans; (2)
HPMLs or Section 35 loans; and (3) a residual category,
comprised of the majority of loans in the mortgage market,
characterized by loans with lower risk and rates that do not meet
the definition of either HOEPA or HPML.
In shaping its final rule concerning HPMLs the Board had
to balance the views of mortgage industry commentators with
those of several consumer advocates. For example, comments by
a large industry trade association indicated that the initially
proposed benchmark of comparable Treasury securities and
thresholds would have resulted in significant coverage of prime
loans.42 On the other hand, several consumer advocate groups
urged the Board to expand new protections to all loan types and
programs that are secured by consumers' principal dwelling
regardless of APR triggers. 43
339 Id.
340 73 Fed. Res. at 44,551, 44,6oi; 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) n.48 [effective
Oct. I, 2009].
341 15 U.S.C. § 1635(e); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2 3 (f).
342 American Bankers Association ("ABA"), Comments to Proposed Rule
Amending Reg. Z 7-8 (Apr. 8, 2oo8), http://www.aba.comlNR/rdonlyres/
365382A4-2 EC6- 4 B41-93A6-28BFAD2 779FB/524Io/RegZApr8_2oo8.pdf
[hereinafter ABA Comments].
341 See, e.g., Comments of the National Consumer Law Center, and
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Nonetheless, consensus was apparent between certain
consumer advocates and some industry trade associations who
supported the use of an APR trigger, on the premise that the
Board should use a mortgage-based benchmark rather than
Treasury securities to ensure that the rate triggers more
accurately reflect the credit risk in the mortgage market.34 4 These
commentators echoed similar suggestions to use the Freddie Mac
Weekly PMMS as a possible benchmark to avoid undue coverage
of the mortgage market.3 45 This suggestion was largely adopted
by the Board in the final rules. Consequently, the resulting
Board's formulation of an APOR as a benchmark is sensible,
particularly since the Board seeks to identify loans that are more
expensive for consumers than regular prime loans for targeting
abuse; and as the Board indicated, the new APOR benchmark
and thresholds will cover all of the subprime market and part of
the Alt-A market.346
The final rules prohibit four practices in connection with
HPMLs, namely: (i) making loans without verifying consumer's
ability to repay; (2) including prepayment penalties, except under
certain conditions; (3) failing to make loans without escrows; and
(4) documenting a loan as home equity lines of credit in a sham
attempt to evade the new provisions.
In crafting the final rules the Board took an additional
step forward in protecting consumers with its elimination of the
"pattern of practice" precondition for enforcing the requirement
that creditors verify consumer's ability to repay prior to extension
of mortgage credit, for both HOEPA loans and HPMLs. As a
result, the new rules will allow consumers to bring individual
action against a creditor for this violation without the need to
show that the lender engaged in a "pattern or practice", which
Consumer Action, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, National Association of Consumer
Advocates, National Fair Housing Alliance, and the Empire Justice Center to
the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve's Proposed Rule Amending Reg. Z 4-
5, 9-IO (Apr. 8, 2oo8), http://www.consumerlaw.org/issues/predatory-
mortgage/content/HOEPACommentsAprilo8.pdf.
311 See, e.g., Comments of the Center for Respohsible Lending ("CRL")on
Proposed Rules Regarding Unfair, Deceptive, Abusive Lending and Servicing
Practices 6-7 (Apr. 8, 2oo8), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/fed-udap-
comments-final-o4o8o8.pdf [hereinafter CRL Comments]; see also ABA
Comments, supra note 342, at 8.
... See, CRL Comments, supra note 344, at 6-7; see ABA Comments, supra
note 342, at 8.
346 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,536.
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was a major hurdle for individual enforcement in HOEPA
cases.
347
However, the Board took a step back on consumer
protection when it removed the initially proposed presumption of
violation of verification of consumer's ability to repay and
replaced it with presumption of compliance. 48 Unfortunately, the
removal of the presumption of violation will make it harder for
consumers to prove that the creditor failed to comply. In
addition, the presumption of compliance does not set a bright line
standard for failure to comply. The Board stated that it did not
adopt a debt-to-income ratio requirement so as not to stifle future
product innovations. However, this leaves some open questions
regarding creditors' compliance with the prohibition. For
example, at what point is a consumer deemed not to have an
ability to repay? Where the debt-to-income ratios are 5o, 6o or
maybe 70 percent?
The Board's prohibition of prepayment penalties for
HPMLs is another welcome protection for consumers in the
subprime market. Specifically, prepayment penalties included in
hybrid ARMs where the term of the prepayment exceeds the
terms of fixed payment periods were particularly problematic for
consumers in the subprime market. These prepayments trapped
consumers in high cost loans, especially in times where the values
of homes decreased, preventing some consumers in the subprime
market from even having the opportunity to refinance into a
more affordable fixed rate mortgage.
The Board's new rules prohibit prepayment penalties
outright for loans where the principle or interest may change in
the first four year after consummation; therefore, doing away
with "2/28" and "3/27" ARMs having prepayment penalties for
consumers in the subprime market. While the rule does not
prohibit prepayment penalties completely it does provide
consumers in the subprime market enough time, at the very least
two years, to get better terms in the mortgage market.349
D. Prohibited Practices Regarding Closed-End Mortgages
The final rules prohibit two additional practices in
... See, CRL Comments, supra note 344, at 13-17.
348 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,549.
14' 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,555-56, 44,603; 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(b)(2) [effective
Oct. i, 2009].
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connection with all types of closed-end mortgage loans secured by
a consumer's principle dwelling. The rules prohibit creditors and
mortgage brokers from coercing appraisers to misstate or
misrepresent the value of an appraised property, as well as
prohibit servicers from engaging in unfair fees and billing
practices.35°
Similar to the prohibition on HPMLs, the Board adopted
the rules prohibiting acts and practices in connection with
appraisers and mortgage loan servicing pursuant to its authority
under HOEPA. However, civil remedies are only available for
consumers against creditors and assignees. The new rules make
it clear that mortgage brokers are not creditors even where the
credit obligation is initially payable to the mortgage broker, as in
table funded transactions.35' In addition, under TILA a servicer is
neither a creditor, unless the creditor is also the servicer of its
own loans, nor is a servicer an assignee, unless it is or was the
owner of the obligation.3 2 Therefore, both in the case of mortgage
brokers and servicers the new rules do not provide consumers
enforcement remedies against either one of these parties.3"3 This is
a gaping hole for consumers' ability to enforce the new
protections that must be addressed by an amendment to TILA
and HOEPA.
Nevertheless, redress is available for consumers against
creditors and assignees for prohibited practices in connection
with appraisers. Also, if the arrangement between a creditor or an
assignee and a servicer gives rise to agency relationship between
the parties, timely enforcement action may be brought for
servicer's engagement in prohibited practices, against the
principal creditor or assignee and the remedies discussed above
may be available for a consumer under these circumstances.
In addition, apart from consumers' ability to enforce the
new prohibitions, covered persons or entities under the new rules
could be subject to enforcement action by the various
administrative agencies charged with enforcement under TILA
and Regulation Z,354 including State attorneys general that may
enforce violations under prohibited under HOEPA. 5S
The final amendments failed to adopt any rules pertaining
350 12 C.F.R. § 226.36 [effective Oct. i, 2009].
351 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(a).
352 73 Fed. Reg. at I716-,7; 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f).
353 73 Fed. Reg. at 1716-17.
3s4 15 U.s.C §§ 16o7(a),(c).
35S 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e).
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to the payments of YSPs by creditors to mortgage brokers. The
matter of payments of YPSs by creditors to mortgage brokers is
one that deserves serious debate and consideration beyond the
scope of this introduction. Nevertheless, it is this writer's opinion
that it would be in the best interest of consumers and competition
in the mortgage market that both creditors and mortgage brokers
dealing directly with consumers provide full information -to
consumers regarding their compensation in the transaction. Such
a requirement, which is currently only imposed on mortgage
brokers, is especially warranted for creditors who use the
originate-to-distribute model of mortgage loan origination, as
those creditors are more likely to be able to provide a good faith
estimate of YSP on the sale of the loan.
E. Prohibited Advertizing Practices
The Board's adoption of prohibited practices for closed-
end mortgage advertising provides an important protection for
consumers. The new rules protect consumers from unfair and
misleading dissemination of information by any party, including
creditors and mortgage brokers.
Although the prohibitions were adopted pursuant to the
Boards HOEPA authority, it is not clear how consumers may
enforce the prohibitions in a case where prohibited information is
disseminated to individual consumers or mass disseminated
through newspapers or the internet, even though no loan was
taken. In addition, civil remedies may only be available against
creditors and assignees and not advertising mortgage brokers.
Nevertheless, similar to the above mentioned prohibitions,
administrative enforcement is available and consumer complaints
to enforcement agencies may prove to be a useful solution to curb
unfair, misleading, and abusive mortgage advertising.3 56
F. Final Thoughts
The final rules are prospective provisions, which are due
mostly to become effective by October i, 2009.15 1 Yet, this
356 15 U.S.C §§ I 7(a),(c); 15 U.S.C. § 64o(e).
357 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,594-95. However, the effective date for the
requirement of escrows on HPMLs is Apr. I, 20ML, except that the requirement
of escrows on HPMLs for manufactured housing is effective Oct. 1, 2010. 73
Fed. Reg. at 44,595.
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important regulatory action taken by the Board will do little to
help consumers currently facing hardship, defaults, and
foreclosures as a consequence of the loose underwriting standards
and proliferation of unfair and abusive mortgage products to
high-risk borrowers in the subprime market. It was estimated
that 1.5 million loans representing over 40% of outstanding
subprime ARM loans are scheduled to reset in 2008358 and an
additional 1.5 million subprime ARM loans are estimated to reset
in 2009.351 With an estimated $350 monthly payment increase for
average subprime ARM, it is very likely that more hardship,
default and foreclosures are on the way.36°
While one may criticize the Board that its recent
regulatory actions should have been taken sooner to prevent the
damage to consumers that is currently unfolding, one also realizes
that hindsight is 20/20 and that it is not only the Board that
should have acted sooner. On.more than one occasion consumer
advocates were prompted to consider asking the Board to
exercise its authority under HOEPA. 361  Having been overly
focused on attempting to find solutions on a national level to the
growing problems of predatory and subprime mortgage lending,
consumers and their advocates were blind to existing solutions
that might have helped to mitigate the unfolding defaults and
foreclosures disaster. Therefore, rather than criticized, the
Board's undertaking of amending Regulation Z should, at the
very least, be commended for its future salutary effect, as by and
large the Board achieved its stated goal of enhancing consumer
protection in the mortgage market.
Nonetheless, certain provisions in the new rules need
"'Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Reducing Preventable Mortgage Foreclosures (Mar. 4 2oo8),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke2 oo8o3o4a.htm
(last visited Nov. I3, 2oo8).
3 Randall S. Kroszner, Governor, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Protecting Homeowners and Sustaining Home Ownership (Feb. 4, 2o08),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner2oo8o2 o4a.htm
(last visited Nov. i3, 2008).
360 Randall S. Kroszner, Governor, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys.,
The Challenges Facing Subprime Mortgage Borrowers (Nov. 5, 2007),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner2oo71105 a.htm
(last visited Nov. I3, 2008).
"I See, e.g., Hearing on Protecting Homeowners, supra note 203, at 36
(question by Rep. Spenser Bachus, Chairman, to Thomas Miller, Att'y Gen.,
Iowa); see also Hearing on Legislative Solutions To Abusive Mortgage Lending
Practices, supra note 209, at ii (statement by Rep. Dennis Moore).
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further strengthening to prevent them from being challenged by
creditors in the courts, specifically the prohibited acts and
practices in connection with HPMLs. This could and should be
achieved through codification of the provisions through
additional congressional action. Congressional action is also
required to address consumer remedies against servicers and in
particular against mortgage brokers. While the Board
acknowledged the large role of mortgage brokers in the
origination process of mortgages, estimating over 6o percent of
mortgages are originated through mortgage brokers ,362 it is
striking that many of TILA and HOEPA disclosure provisions
are now evidently unenforceable, neither by consumers nor by
administrative agencies, against mortgage brokers. If mortgage
brokers are to continue their significant role in the mortgage
market, TILA and HOEPA must be amended to cover mortgage
brokers, so as to provide consumers redress in cases of violations
by mortgage brokers.
CONCLUSION
The Board's final rules amending Regulation Z are an
important step forward for consumer protection from abusive
lending acts or practices in the mortgage market. Through the
adoption of the final rules, the Board made it clear that it has
powerful tools at .its disposal and that it is ready when necessary
to take action to protect consumers in the mortgage market.
Nevertheless, consumers and their advocates should continue
working to fortify the protections afforded by new regulations
with congressional legislation.
362 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,526.
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